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Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical
and Normative Foundations
ANN M. SCARLETT†
INTRODUCTION
Justice Marshall described a corporation as “an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in [a]
contemplation of law.”1 While it is easy to imagine the
purposes for which an individual may act, the artificial
nature of a corporation makes it difficult to know the
purposes for which a corporation acts or should act.
Scholars, judges, and politicians have long debated the
proper purpose of a corporation. Does a corporation exist for
the benefit of its shareholders, its managers, its employees,
its customers, the public at large, or some combination of
these groups? That question directly impacts the allocation
of power within a corporation. Should directors and officers
have complete authority to control the corporation? Should
shareholders, employees, or the public have the ability to
challenge the decisions made by the corporation’s directors
and officers? If so, how and when can they bring such
challenges?
These questions have been intensely debated as the
United States experienced a series of corporate scandals
during the first decade of the 21st century. The scandals
began with Enron and WorldCom in 2001, followed by the
backdating of stock options scandals at numerous
corporations during the middle of the decade, and concluded
with the numerous scandals related to subprime mortgages
at the end of the decade. In response to these events, new

† Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. I thank Jane Gayou, Sarah Larson,
and Justin Mulligan for their exceptional research assistance. This article was
supported by a sabbatical research grant from Saint Louis University.
1. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
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statutes and regulations were imposed on corporations.2 In
addition, various methods for increasing shareholder power
relative to the board of directors have been proposed by
shareholder primacy advocates, who believe that the
corporation is owned by its shareholders and also that the
board of directors must act for the purpose of maximizing
shareholder wealth.3 Shareholder primacy advocates’
proposals have gained traction. For instance, when
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it specifically included a
provision giving the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) the authority to grant shareholders proxy access to
nominate directors.4 The SEC did adopt a rule to give
shareholders the power to nominate directors for election,
but the rule was later struck down on judicial review.5
Dodd-Frank also included provisions giving shareholders a
say on pay with the right to non-binding votes on executive
pay and golden parachutes6 and a provision requiring a
corporation to disclose in its proxy statement the

2. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
3. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business
Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (arguing that,
because shareholders own the corporation, the corporation’s responsibility is to
increase profits); see also LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER
ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 3-5 (2011) (describing
shareholders’ efforts to increase their power over corporate affairs and the
resulting alteration of the corporate governance landscape); William T. Allen,
Our Schrizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
261, 264-66 (1992) (describing theories of corporate purpose); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
840 (2005) (arguing “shareholders should have the power to adopt charter
provisions that would permit them subsequently to intervene in specific
business decisions”).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 971.
5. SEC Rule 14a-11 required a corporation to include certain shareholder
nominated directors in its proxy statement, but it was struck down in Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951.
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relationship between executive compensation and company
performance. 7
Other scholars have intensely argued against such
proposals and the shareholder primacy theory of the
corporation. Good arguments have also been made that at
least some of the recent corporate scandals were caused by
directors and officers seeking to maximize shareholder
wealth, by raising stock prices to the detriment of all else.8
A competing corporate model is the director primacy theory,
which argues that the power to make corporate decisions is
vested solely in the board of directors and the board serves
“as the nexus of the various contracts making up the
corporation.”9 While rejecting the shareholder primacy
theory, the director primacy theory embraces the same
shareholder wealth maximization purpose of the board of
directors.10 The team production theory also views the board
as having the power to make the corporation’s decisions, but
argues that directors and officers must “mediat[e] the
various and often conflicting interests of shareholders” and
the interests of “customers, suppliers, employees, and other
stakeholders whose specific investments contribute to the
firm’s success.”11 The stakeholder or managerialist model
views the corporation as a social institution in which the
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953.
8. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 22 (2012) (stating that
Enron’s “managers and employees were famous for their fixation on raising
stock price”); E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance
and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 441-42
(2003) (stating the Enron and WorldCom scandals revealed that “(1) officers ran
amok, wallowing in greed-driven schemes and other abuses; and (2) directors
allowed it to happen, tolerating officers who were managing to the market while
they contented the directors with ever-rising stock prices”).
9. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003).
10. Id. at 551.
11. STOUT, supra note 8, at 110-11 (quoting Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism
About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006)); see also
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 253-54 (1999) (arguing that the board of directors acts
as a “mediating hierarchy” among the corporation’s team-specific assets
invested by shareholders, managers, and employees, and rejecting the sole
pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization).
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board’s duties extend beyond assuring investors a fair
return and includes some duty to all those affected by the
corporation, such as employees, suppliers, customers, and
the public.12
This debate over corporate purpose is not new. It raged
in the first half of the 20th century with the proliferation of
public corporations, in which many investors could purchase
shares in corporations on a public stock exchange but play
no active role in the management of those corporations.13
Before the early 1900s, most corporations were privately
owned by a small group of shareholders who typically
participated in managing the corporation.14 But even then,
courts struggled with the question of corporate purpose
within these private companies as shareholders sought to
challenge the actions of directors through litigation. The
shareholder derivative lawsuit is an important part of the
debate about corporate purpose because, through such
lawsuits, shareholders seek to hold directors accountable for
their decisions. Yet scholars in the modern debate over
corporate purpose have ignored its historical origins as
reflected in shareholder litigation prior to the 20th century.
Almost all scholarship that even briefly mentions early
shareholder derivative lawsuits in the United States relies
solely upon a 15-page paper by Professor Bert Prunty
published in 1957.15 This Article seeks to remedy this gap in
the literature by more fully examining English and U.S. law
12. E.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 264-66; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145-46 (1932).
13. Professors Berle and Means famously described the dangers inherent in
the structural separation of passive ownership from the active management of
the corporation. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxx-xxxv (rev. ed. 1967) (1932).
14. Id. at 4; Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation:
Corporate Governance Reform in Context, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 10), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136044.
15. Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its
Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957); see, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Shareholder Litigation: The Accidental Elegance of Aronson v. Lewis, in THE
ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 165, 167 n.4 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008)
(noting the article draws from Professor Prunty’s work); see also Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 n.3 (1970) (citing Professor Prunty’s work).
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on the shareholder derivative action to understand its true
historical and normative foundations.
The shareholder derivative action is a form of
representative litigation long recognized by courts in the
United States, as is the class action. These are
representative actions because one or a few persons stand
for another or group of persons.16 Today it is commonly said
that the plaintiff in a class action represents the other class
members,17 while the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative
action brings suit on behalf of the corporation.18 A modern
shareholder can potentially pursue litigation of either type
depending on the nature of the claim asserted. A
shareholder’s action is derivative when it is based on an
injury to the corporation, such as a claim for monetary
damages based on corporate mismanagement.19 A
shareholder may also pursue a direct action in his own
name, or as a class action on behalf of himself and other
shareholders, when the claim is based upon a personal right

16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (9th ed. 2009). Representative actions also
include those in which a person is designated to represent another, such as a
guardian appointed to represent a child or an executor appointed to represent
the estate of a deceased person. See id.
17. E.g., ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY
LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 17 (4th ed. 2012). A defendant class is also possible,
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), but is extremely rare in modern litigation. CIGNA
Healthcare of St. Louis v. Kaiser, 294 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2002) (calling
defendant classes “rare birds”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 370, 388 (2000) (stating “[d]efendant class actions are as rare as unicorns”).
18. See, e.g., Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 614 (4th Cir. 2011);
Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1264 (Del. 2012); Boland v.
Boland, 31 A.3d 529, 541-42 (Md. 2011).
19. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, § 8.2, at 363
(2002); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 509 (defining a derivative
action as “[a] suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right belonging to
the fiduciary; esp., a suit asserted by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf
against a third party (usu. a corporate officer) because of the corporation’s
failure to take some action against the third party”).
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belonging to the shareholders, such as a claim regarding
shareholder voting rights.20
Commentators have frequently stated that the United
States imported the shareholder derivative action from
England.21 However, that is not entirely accurate. What the
United States imported from the English Court of Chancery
was the necessary parties rule and exceptions to that rule.
Part I of this Article will examine the historical and
normative foundations of both class actions and shareholder
derivative actions in the English Court of Chancery during
the 1700s and early 1800s. Early representative litigation in
the English Court of Chancery reveals examples of group
litigation that are comparable to today’s class actions. It
also reveals that similar actions involving shareholders
were recognized by the English Chancery Court, but such
actions were greatly limited.
Part II will then compare the English precedents to the
first instances and the evolution of class actions and
shareholder derivative actions in the United States during
the 1800s. Before the American Revolution, corporate law
and shareholder litigation in the colonies followed English
precedents.22 However, U.S. law began to diverge soon after
the United States won its independence from England.
During the 1800s, U.S. courts recognized an exception to the
necessary parties rule that permitted representative
20. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, § 8.2, at 362-64 (contrasting direct
shareholder suits from derivative shareholder litigation); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 509.
21. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341, 347 (1855) (noting
that the equity jurisdiction of U.S. courts is the same as in England from which
it was derived and holding that courts of equity have jurisdiction over
corporations in claims brought by their shareholders); Nicholas Calcina Howson,
When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: The Global
Crisis and the Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44,
47
(2009),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/howson.pdf
(describing derivative actions as “imported into U.S. state corporate law from
England”).
22. See Bank of the U. S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809) (“[O]ur
ideas of a corporation, its privileges and its disabilities, are derived entirely
from the English books, we resort to them for aid, in ascertaining its
character.”); see also Howson, supra note 21, at 47 (noting the shareholder
derivative action was imported into U.S. state law from England).
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lawsuits, but the contours of these actions differed
significantly from such actions in England. Today, these
lawsuits would be classified as class actions and
shareholder derivative actions in the United States. The
Part will demonstrate that the historical and normative
foundations of the U.S. shareholder derivative action
differed significantly from that of England, and that the
shareholder derivative action is more closely related to the
class action than is commonly recognized.
The shared history of these two forms of representative
litigation has long been overlooked, but it reveals the early
normative justifications for shareholder litigation. For the
United States’ first 150 years, shareholders were permitted
to bring lawsuits on behalf of themselves and all other
shareholders in certain circumstances, similar to class
actions. That formulation did not change until the late
1940s, when courts began to regularly describe such
lawsuits as being brought on behalf of the corporation. Part
III will examine this shift in the normative foundations of
U.S. shareholder derivative litigation and explore the
possible explanations for the variances. It will also examine
the changes in the limitations on when shareholders can
bring derivative actions. The historical and normative
foundations of shareholder derivative litigation offer
potential insights for the current debate on shareholder
power and corporate purpose.
I. REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION IN THE
ENGLISH COURT OF CHANCERY
Examples of representative litigation are found in the
“earliest days of English law.”23 The history of group
litigation developed gradually from communal harms within
English feudal society during the 12th to 15th centuries.24
23. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999).
24. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 268-77 (1987) (noting that group litigation developing from
communal harms “generated no theory [or] legal doctrine”); see also Raymond B.
Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 515,
517–24 (1974).
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The earliest published examples of group litigation date
from the 16th century and fall into two main categories:
manorial conflicts between landlords and tenants, and
parochial conflicts between villagers and parsons. 25
The 1681 case of How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove26 is an
example of group litigation involving manorial conflicts. The
lord of a manor sued his tenants claiming a grant of “free
warren,” which is the right to kill small game.27 The English
Court of Chancery held that the case was proper in equity
because it was essentially a bill of peace and its
maintenance would avoid multiplicity of suits.28
An example of a parochial conflict, as well as an
example of the binding nature of group litigation, is Brown
v. Vermuden29 from 1676, in which a vicar sued the miners
of his parish to enforce his customary right to purchase a
tenth of their ore.30 In an earlier case brought by the vicar’s
predecessor, the miners chose four persons to defend the
suit for them, and the case was decided in favor of the
vicar’s predecessor.31 In the current case, a miner named
Vermuden insisted that he was not bound by the previous
decree, because he was not a party to it.32 The Chancery
Court dismissed this argument stating that “[i]f the
Defendant should not be bound, Suits of this Nature . . .
would be infinite, and impossible to be ended.”33
Every group litigation case decided during the 16th and
17th centuries involved these two types of conflicts,
manorial or parochial, between members of agricultural

25. Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a
History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 867 (1977).
26. How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch.); 1 Vern. 22.
27. Id. at 277, 1 Vern. at 22.
28. Id.
29. Brown v. Vermuden, (1676) 22 Eng. Rep. 796; 1 Chan. Cas. 272.
30. Id. at 796, 1 Chan. Cas. at 272.
31. Id. at 796-97, 1 Chan. Cas. at 272.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 797, 1 Chan. Cas. at 272.
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communities.34 These litigation groups, which could involve
either plaintiffs or defendants,35 represented shared
identical interests, and their members consented to
representation by the named parties.36
A. Transition to Class Litigation in the English Court of
Chancery
Group litigation began to transition to class litigation
during the 18th century.37 Group litigation relied on the
representative authority conferred by preexisting groups of
villagers or parishioners,38 whereas more commerciallyconnected groups such as proprietors and shareholders
began to seek recognition as litigative entities in the 18th
century.39 During this century, the English Chancery Court
created the necessary parties rule or proper parties rule, 40
which required the joinder of all parties interested in the
matter so that a final resolution could be made.41 As with
any rule, the Chancery Court soon recognized exceptions to
the necessary parties rule. In its creation of exceptions, the
Chancery Court increasingly set aside the idea of consent
and instead relied on shared interest of the group as the key
for representation, although the precise degree of
34. Yeazell, supra note 25, at 872.
35. Id. at 880.
36. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 175-76; see also Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 F. Cas.
1079, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1865) (stating the medieval manorial cases involved “a
community of interest growing out of the nature and condition of the right in
dispute”). In terms of jurisdiction, the Chancery Court heard most of these cases
from the 16th century and almost all such cases during the 17th century.
YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 125.
37. Id. at 165-66.
38. See id. at 162-64; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., An Historical
Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1861-63
(1998); Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suits as an
Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1013-14 (2003).
39. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 176.
40. For simplicity, this Article will refer to the rule as the necessary parties
rule although it may also properly be referred to as the proper parties rule.
41. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of
a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255-56, 1262-70 (1961).
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organization required for a finding of shared interest
varied.42 An English court in 1901 summarized the Court of
Chancery’s necessary parties rule as follows:
The old rule in the Court of Chancery was very simple and
perfectly well understood. Under the old practice the Court
required the presence of all parties interested in the matter in
suit, in order that a final end might be made of the controversy.
But when the parties were so numerous that you could never
“come at justice”, to use an expression in one of the older cases, if
everybody interested was made a party, the rule was not allowed
to stand in the way. It was originally a rule of convenience: for the
sake of convenience it was relaxed. Given a common interest and
a common grievance, a representative suit was in order if the
relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff
43
proposed to represent.

As more simply stated later by the English Supreme Court’s
procedural rules: “Where there are numerous persons
having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or
more of such persons may sue . . . on behalf of or for the
benefit of all persons so interested.”44
As examples of the application of the necessary parties
rule and its exceptions to class actions, consider the
following two cases involving similar factual scenarios. In
the 1751 case of Leigh v. Thomas,45 the Chancery Court
sustained a demurrer (similar to a modern motion to
dismiss) for want of parties when part of a ship’s crew
appointed two members as their agents. The plaintiffs sued
for prize money for which they claimed entitlement under
the general articles of the ship, which stated the crew had
42. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 277.
43. Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 8 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding
that the necessary parties rule was not limited to persons having a beneficial
proprietary interest) (U.K.).
44. Smith v. Cardiff Corp., [1954] 1 Q.B. 210 at 214-15 (Eng.) (quoting Rules
of the Supreme Court Ord 16, r 9 (Eng.)). In this case, four tenants sued “on
behalf of themselves and all other tenants” to challenge their landlords’ decision
to increase rests on a differential basis according to the tenants’ incomes; the
court held it was not a proper representative action because there was no class
of persons “having the same interest” but rather two classes with conflicting
interests since affluent tenants subsidize the others. Id. at 212, 220-22.
45. Leigh v. Thomas, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch.); 2 Ves. Sen. 312.
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liberty to appoint two agents.46 The two agents filing this
lawsuit were appointed by an agreement signed by 64
members of the 80-person crew.47 “They brought this bill
therefore, not on behalf of the whole crew,” but on behalf of
themselves and those 64 members.48 Against the demurrer,
the plaintiffs cited several cases where all persons
interested were not made parties “from necessity.”49 The
court allowed the demurrer but suggested that the result
might be different if the two agents had brought a bill on
behalf of the whole crew.50
In 1807, the captain of a privateer sued its owners for
an account of prize money in Good v. Blewitt.51 After the
defendants objected that all interested persons must be
parties, the Chancery Court gave leave for the captain to
amend his bill to state that he represented all other
members of the crew.52 The court then expressly rejected the
defendant’s objection with regards to joinder, declaring that
this situation “calls peculiarly” for an exception to the
necessary parties rule, because it would be impossible to
locate and join all these sailors individually.53 The court also
emphasized that the representation was occurring on the
plaintiff’s end, and there was no greater inconvenience to
the defendant if all the plaintiffs were joined than
otherwise.54

46. Id. at 201, 2 Ves. Sen. at 312.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 201-02, 2 Ves. Sen. at 312-13.
51. Good v. Blewitt, (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (Ch.); 13 Ves. Jun. 397.
52. Id. at 343-45, 13 Ves. Jun. at 398-99.
53. Id. at 345, 13 Ves. Jun. at 401.
54. Id., 13 Ves. Jun. at 401-02; cf. Brown v. Harris, (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 401
(Ch.) 403; 13 Ves. Jun. 552, 558 (allowing a bill filed by several officers on behalf
of themselves and other soldiers to obtain prize-money).
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B. Shareholder Actions in the English Court of Chancery
During the 18th and 19th centuries, the English Court
of Chancery also recognized a similar exception to the
necessary parties rule for lawsuits involving the owners of
businesses, and these actions can be seen as precursors to
the modern shareholder derivative action. The cases
involved a variety of business enterprises such as
partnerships and joint-stock companies, as well as
corporations. Joint-stock companies were far more prevalent
than corporations during this time period and in some ways
were more similar to partnerships, but the capital of jointstock companies were divided into transferable shares
similar to corporations and thus had a larger number of
investors than partnerships generally.55 In applying the
necessary parties rule and its exceptions, however, the
English decisions treated these business entities the same
and recognized an exception to the necessary parties rule
for actions by or against their owners. The exception
recognized by these cases was similar to that for class
actions.56 However, a few cases demonstrate that the
development of an exception to the necessary parties rule
for shareholder-type actions was a bumpy path, as is often
the case with common law.
In the 1722 case of Chancey v. May,57 the English
Chancery Court held that part of the proprietors of an
enterprise may bring suit without making all the
proprietors actual parties, if they sue on behalf of
themselves and all the proprietors. 58 The treasurer and
manager of the Temple Mills Brass-works brought suit on
behalf of themselves and all other proprietors against the
late treasurers and managers alleging mismanagement and
55. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 139 (3d ed. 2005);
see also Van Sandau v. Moore, (1826) 38 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ch.) 177-79; 1 Russ.
441, 458-63 (Lord Eldon digresses at length on the social, legal, and political
history of the joint stock company).
56. See Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.) 202-04; 2 Hare 461,
490-95.
57. Chancey v. May, (1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592.
58. Id. at 265, Prec. Ch. at 592.
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embezzlement.59 The defendants demurred because all the
proprietors were not made parties and they might be
“harassed and perplexed with multiplicity of suits.”60 The
court denied the demurrer finding that the proprietors were
suing “on behalf of themselves and all the others,” and so all
the rest “were in effect parties.”61 Furthermore, the court
stated that it would be impracticable if all were made
parties by name and there would be “no coming of justice.” 62
By contrast, the Chancery Court did not permit an
exception to the necessary parties rule in a similar situation
in Moffat v. Farquharson63 in 1788. The bill was filed by the
plaintiff, “on behalf of himself and the other part-owners of
a ship,” for an account of the ship’s profits and particularly
the money paid to the defendants for the appointment of a
captain.64 The defendants demurred, arguing that all partowners should have been parties.65 Finding this case
distinguishable from earlier cases “of part of the
parishioners filing a bill for themselves and the other
parishioners,” the court held that all the part-owners must
be made actual parties.66 However, the reporter recognized
that the case conflicted with later cases by noting after the
case: “The decision here is clearly wrong.”67
In Lloyd v. Loaring,68 three officers of the Caledonian
Lodge of Free Masons filed a bill on behalf of all the other
lodge members seeking the return of a chest of the chapter’s
ceremonial items that they alleged the two defendants had
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Moffat v. Farquharson, (1788) 29 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.); 2 Bro. C.C. 338.
64. Id. at 129, 2 Bro. C.C. at 338.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis omitted); cf. Williams v. Farrington, (1789) 29 Eng. Rep.
395 (Ch.) 395-96; 3 Bro. C.C. 39, 39-40 (permitting one owner to sue the captain
of a ship on behalf of all the other part-owners).
68. Lloyd v. Loring, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (Ch.); 6 Ves. Jun. 773.
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stolen69 The defendants demurred for want of parties
arguing that the three plaintiffs could not file on behalf of
themselves and all the others because the interest stated by
the bill was joint among all the lodge members, and
therefore the others must be joined.70 Lord Eldon allowed
the demurrer because the plaintiffs had sued in effect as a
corporation, which the Lodge was not.71 However, Lord
Eldon noted that if the plaintiffs had sued as individuals
jointly interested, on behalf of the others, alleging that it
was “manifestly inconvenient to justice to make them all
parties,” then the bill “might be very proper.”72 Seizing the
hint, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend to sue as
individuals on behalf of the other members, and Lord Eldon
allowed the amendment.73
In the 1805 case of Adair v. New River Company,74 Lord
Eldon similarly recognized an exception to the necessary
parties rule in a case involving a true corporation.75 The
New River Company was a corporation originally created by
King James I in return for a share of its profits; the Crown’s
original share had subsequently been divided into many
shares purchased by at least one hundred individuals.76 One
of these shareholders argued that he was being mis-taxed
(as individual shareholders were accountable for such tax),
and that he was contributing disproportionately to the

69. Id. at 1302-03, 6 Ves. Jun. at 773-75.
70. Id. at 1303, 6 Ves. Jun. at 775.
71. Id. at 1305, 6 Ves. Jun. at 779 (Lord Eldon’s concern was the affectation
of a “corporate character” in the bill).
72. Id. at 1304, 6 Ves. Jun. at 777; cf. Douglas v. Horsfall, (1825) 57 Eng. Rep.
315 (Ch.); 2 Sim. & St. 184 (allowing demurrer because the trustees for a
company seeking specific performance of a company lease did not join all
members nor file the bill on behalf of the other members).
73. Lloyd, 31 Eng. Rep. at 1304-05, 6 Ves. Jun. at 778; cf. Small v. Atwood,
(1832) 159 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ch.) 1071, 1073; You. 407, 455, 459-60 (permitting a
suit by several partners of the British Iron Company on behalf of the other
partners, seeking to have a fraudulent contract rescinded).
74. Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves. Jun. 429.
75. Id. at 1159, 11 Ves. Jun. at 444.
76. Id. at 1153, 11 Ves. Jun. at 429.
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company’s total tax payments.77 The shareholder sued the
company as a corporation and joined eight individual
shareholders, seeking the money owed him.78 The
defendants objected for the lack of necessary parties, stating
that all the shareholders must be joined to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to account for differing
circumstances among the shareholders regarding taxes
already paid.79 The plaintiff argued, citing Lloyd v. Loaring,
that while the necessary parties requirement is
theoretically the rule, it does not prevail where it is
impossible for justice to be served otherwise, such as here
where joining all the parties was impossible.80 Although
Lord Eldon dismissed the bill on the merits, he rejected at
length the objection for lack of necessary parties stating
that, while the application of the rule depends on the
circumstances of each case, it should not be applied where
joining all the parties is impracticable.81
In Cockburn v. Thompson,82 the plaintiffs were
proprietors of The Philanthropic Annuity Institution, whose
purpose became impossible when Parliament denied the
Institution permission to accept and grant annuities in the
name of trustees.83 The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves
and all other proprietors, sued the Institution’s solicitor and
bankers for an account of the sums received by them on
behalf of the Institution and to have all of the plaintiffs’
money returned to them.84 Defendants objected that other
proprietors existed who were not named in the bill, and that
they must be made parties.85 Citing Chancey v. May and
77. Id. at 1153, 11 Ves. Jun. at 429-30.
78. Id. at 1153-54, 11 Ves. Jun. at 429-30.
79. Id. at 1154, 11 Ves. Jun. at 430.
80. Id., 11 Ves. Jun. at 431.
81. Id. at 1159, 11 Ves. Jun. at 444; see also YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 277
(noting Lord Eldon permitted the representation of a group “entirely lack[ing]
social cohesion,” as the members could not be identified much less contacted for
their consent).
82. Cockburn v. Thompson, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves. Jun. 321.
83. Id. at 1005, 16 Ves. Jun. at 321-22.
84. Id. at 1005-06, 16 Ves. Jun. at 321-22.
85. Id. at 1006, 16 Ves. Jun. at 322-23.
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Adair v. New River Company, the plaintiffs argued that the
necessary parties rule may be dispensed with when joinder
of all parties is impracticable.86 Lord Eldon held that though
the plaintiffs could not bring forward all the persons who
may be liable “that is not an obstacle, that should prevent
the institution of this suit, if necessary to justice.”87 Lord
Eldon stated the strict rule that all persons materially
interested ought to be parties, but acknowledged that there
were “several well known cases of exception” and cited
Chancey v. May and Adair v. New River Company, among
others.88 His view of the necessary parties rule and its
exceptions can be summarized by a quote from the end of
his analysis.
The principle being founded in convenience, a departure from it
has been said to be justifiable, where necessary; and in all these
cases the Court has not hesitated to depart from it, with the view
by original and subsequent arrangement to do all, that can be
done for the purposes of justice; rather than hold, that no justice
shall subsist among persons, who may have entered into these
89
contracts.

The justifications for an exception to the necessary
parties rule in shareholder-type cases were further
developed in Meux v. Maltby,90 which involved a lawsuit
against the directors of the East Country Dock Company, a
joint-stock company established by an act of Parliament.91
In 1804, Richard Frost had made a contract with Moses
Agar to lease a house and contributed to its construction
costs,92 but later Agar claimed he could not give Frost his
86. Id., 16 Ves. Jun. at 323-24.
87. Id. at 1008, 16 Ves. Jun. at 330.
88. Id. at 1007-08, 16 Ves. Jun. at 326-27 (citing Chancey v. May, (1722) 24
Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592; Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153
(Ch.); 11 Ves. Jun. 429).
89. Id. at 1008, 16 Ves. Jun. at 329 (emphasis added).
90. Meux v. Maltby, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (Ch.); 2 Swans 277.
91. Id. at 621-22, 2 Swans. at 277-79 (noting the establishing act decreed that
all current or future property belonging to the company was vested in the
company, and that it would be lawful for the company, in the name of its
treasurer, to sue any person who might damage this property).
92. Id. at 621, 2 Swans. at 277.
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lease because the property had been sold to the East
Country Dock Company.93 The assignees of Richard Frost
sued the treasurer and six directors of East Country Dock,
seeking specific performance of the lease.94 These
defendants protested that they could not grant the lease
because they did not have the whole interest and the other
proprietors of the company were not made parties.95 The
opinion began with the general rule that the plaintiff must
bring before the court all necessary parties, but noted the
rule had exceptions.96 It quoted from Lord Eldon in Lloyd v.
Loaring that requiring the impracticable joinder of parties
would result in a “failure of justice.”97 It also quoted Lord
Eldon in Adair v. New River Company that if the plaintiff
brings enough of those who represent the King’s share “as
can be taken duly and honestly” to litigate the issue “that
ought, in equity, to bind those who are present,
representing those who are absent.”98 The judge declared
that this “current of authority” adopts a “general principal
of exception,” in which the general rule “yields when justice
requires” on either the plaintiff or defendant side.99
Applying the rule to this case, the judge noted the only
novelty was that the plaintiff’s bill “requires an act to be
done by the absentees.”100 Acknowledging that a lease
cannot be executed by a few on behalf of the rest, the judge
declared that the rights of the absent parties may still be

93. Id. at 621-22, 2 Swans. at 277-78 (noting the property was sold by Agar to
a man named Matthews, and Matthews then sold the property to Sir Charles
Price and William Browning, in trust for the East Country Dock Company).
94. Id. at 622, 2 Swans. at 279.
95. Id. at 623, 2 Swans. at 281.
96. Id.
97. Id., 2 Swans. at 283 (quoting Lloyd v. Loring, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1302
(Ch.) 1303; 6 Ves. Jun. 773, 775).
98. Id. at 624, 2 Swans. at 284 (quoting Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32
Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.) 1159; 11 Ves. Jun. 429, 445) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id., 2 Swans. at 284-85.
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bound.101 The judge then wrote rather dramatically on the
necessity of not letting the company avoid responsibility for
want of parties: “Are the company aware . . . that, in every
case, it is impracticable to compel them to perform a
contract? That, unless all the proprietors are made parties,
which is impossible, no suit can be maintained against them
. . . ?”102 The judge asserted that he would “do what [he] can
to assist the Plaintiffs,” by declaring them entitled to the
lease and restraining the East Country Dock treasurer from
disturbing their possession.103
Similarly, in Hichens v. Congreve,104 the court permitted
shareholders in a mining company, on behalf of themselves
and all other shareholders, to file a bill seeking to recover
money misappropriated by the directors. 105 The defendants
demurred that all 200 shareholders had to be made parties,
but the exception to the necessary parties rule was so well
established by this point in time that the court rejected the
defendants’ objection in a mere five paragraphs.106 The court
similarly approved a representative suit by shareholders on
behalf of all shareholders against the corporation’s directors
in Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co.,107 in which the
plaintiff’s bill sought to force the directors to pay calls on
stock subscribed by them.108
Not all shareholders were successful in their efforts to
pursue lawsuits on behalf of themselves and all other
shareholders. In Long v. Yonge,109 the plaintiffs were fortyseven members of the Norwich Equitable Insurance

101. Id., 2 Swans. at 285 (“If the Court cannot proceed to compel the
Defendants to do the act required, it must go as far as it can.”).
102. Id., 2 Swans. at 286.
103. Id.
104. Hichens v. Congreve (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.); 4 Russ. 562.
105. Id. at 917, 923, 4 Russ. at 562, 577.
106. Id. at 922, 4 Russ. at 575-77.
107. Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co., (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Vice Ch.); 11
Sim. 327.
108. Id. at 900, 11 Sim. at 327-28.
109. Long v. Yonge, (1830) 57 Eng. Rep. 827 (Ch.); 2 Sim. 369.
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Company, a joint-stock company.110 On behalf of themselves
and all other members, they sued the survivors of the
original directors and trustees of the company, those
appointed to replace the original directors and trustees, and
the executor of the late company secretary for
mismanagement of the company and sought to have the
company dissolved.111 They noted in their bill that it would
be impracticable to join all the shareholders, who numbered
around 4,000.112 The defendants demurred for want of equity
because all 4,000 shareholders had not been made parties
and because several of the directors had not been made
parties (presumably as defendants).113 The court allowed
demurrer.114 After noting both the general rule that all
interested parties must be joined and the exception stated
in both Cockburn v. Thompson and Adair v. New River
Company, the court stated that the demurrer would have
been denied if the bill had been filed by several members on
behalf of the rest against someone whom all the members
had a grievance.115 However, the court concluded that to
dissolve the company would deprive all the members of a
right they currently enjoyed, and this could not be done
without making them parties.116
By contrast, consider the 1841 case of Wallworth v.
Holt,117 in which some of the shareholders of an insolvent
joint-stock bank sued on behalf of themselves and all other
shareholders, seeking dissolution and their debts from the
directors.118 The defendants demurred, arguing that all
shareholders must be joined.119 Plaintiffs argued that there
were too many shareholders to make them all individually
110. Id. at 827, 2 Sim. at 269-70.
111. Id. at 827-29, 2 Sim. at 269-75.
112. Id. at 829, 2 Sim. at 374.
113. Id., 2 Sim. at 375.
114. Id. at 834, 2 Sim. at 387.
115. Id. at 833, 2 Sim. at 386.
116. Id.
117. Wallworth v. Holt, (1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch.); 4 My. & Cr. 619.
118. Id. at 243, 4 My. & Cr. at 631-32.
119. Id. at 243, 4 My. & Cr. at 632.
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parties to the suit and that all shareholders had a common
interest.120 The court denied the demurrer.121 Although the
court recognized that there were strong authorities holding
that when a bill seeks dissolution all shareholders must be
parties, it concluded that here they were too numerous and
the court should “adapt its practice . . . to the existing state
of society.”122 Citing Cockburn v. Thompson and Chancey v.
May, the court stated that it is “scarcely necessary to say
anything as to the objection for want of parties.”123
C. Foss v. Harbottle and Subsequent Developments in
English Law
The 1843 case of Foss v. Harbottle124 is the seminal case
cited regarding the shareholder derivative action in English
law.125 Two shareholders in The Victoria Park Company,
which was incorporated by an Act of Parliament, sued on
behalf of themselves and all the other shareholders except
the defendants, who included five directors and the solicitor
of the company.126 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
engaged in fraudulent and illegal transactions, using their
positions to cause the corporation to purchase their own
lands at a price exceeding the value of such lands and to
cause the corporation to mortgage the lands to fund those
purchases.127 They sought, among other things, to have the
120. Id. at 241, 4 My. & Cr. at 627-28.
121. Id. at 246, 4 My. & Cr. at 633.
122. Id. at 244, 4 My. & Cr. at 635. But see Deeks v. Stanhope, (1844) 60 Eng.
Rep. 278 (Ch.) 282-85; 14 Sim. 57, 66-75 (holding all the shareholders must be
joined for dissolution to occur, but giving plaintiffs leave to amend their bill to
seek only return of the controverted funds because the court recognized the
lawsuit would be impossible to maintain if all shareholders were made parties).
123. Wallworth, 41 Eng. Rep. at 244-46, 14 Sim. at 636-39 (citing Cockburn v.
Thompson, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves. Jun. 321; Chancey v. May,
(1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592).
124. Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.); 2 Hare 461.
125. Skeel, supra note 15, at 167 (stating Foss v. Harbottle “looms large in the
history of Anglo-American derivative litigation” and “courts on both sides of the
Atlantic treated the case as a watershed throughout the nineteenth century”).
126. Foss, 67 Eng. Rep. at 189-90, 2 Hare at 461.
127. Id. at 190-96, 201, 2 Hare at 461-75, 488.
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defendants “make good to the company” the losses and
expenses occasioned by the acts complained of.128
Defendants demurred for “want of equity, want of parties
and multifariousness; and suggesting that all the
proprietors of shares in the company . . . were necessary
parties.”129 Defendants contended that the corporation itself
was a necessary party and further that only the corporation
was entitled to bring this action.130
The court had to consider whether it should depart from
the rule requiring “that the corporation should sue in its
own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of
someone whom the law has appointed to be its
representative.”131 The court, however, recognized that
“[c]orporations like this, of a private nature, are in truth
little more than private partnerships.”132 Relying on
Wallsworth v. Holt, the court stated that:
If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by
some of its members, for which no adequate remedy
remained, except that of a suit by individual
corporators in their private characters, and asking
in such character the protection of those rights to
which in their corporate character they were
entitled, … the claims of justice would be found
superior to any difficulties arising out of technical
rules respecting the mode in which corporations are
required to sue.133
Although Foss involved a true corporation, it recognized a
right for shareholders to bring a lawsuit on behalf of all the
shareholders in certain situations, just as the court in
Wallworth v. Holt did with respect to a joint-stock
company.134
128. Id. at 199, 2 Hare at 482-83.
129. Id. at 200, 2 Hare at 484.
130. Id., 2 Hare at 485.
131. Id. at 202, 2 Hare at 490-91.
132. Id. at 202-03, 2 Hare at 491-92.
133. Id. at 203, 2 Hare at 492.
134. Wallworth v. Holt, (1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch.) 244-46; 4 My. & Cr. 619,
634-40.
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On the facts of Foss, however, the court concluded that
the individual shareholders could not bring a lawsuit
because, pursuant to The Victoria Park Company’s charter,
the shareholders retained the power to call a special general
meeting and a majority of the shareholders could confirm
the transactions.135 In other words, a majority of
shareholders assembled at a special general meeting could
confirm the transaction and defeat any decree sought from
the court in this lawsuit. However, the court stated that if a
transaction is void, such as when a transaction is beyond
the powers of the corporation or when managers engaged in
fraudulent misrepresentation, the corporation cannot
confirm it “whilst any one dissenting voice is raised against
it.”136
Later courts interpreted Foss’s holding to mean that
nothing connected with internal corporate disputes could be
made the subject of a bill by one shareholder on behalf of
himself and all other shareholders, unless the acts were not
ratifiable by a simple majority of shareholders, such as
ultra vires or oppressive acts.137 In other words, shareholder
suits were allowed only if an illegal or fraudulent act was
alleged, or the wrong was committed by the majority
shareholders against the minority shareholders.138 Although
the corporation was the proper party to bring a lawsuit for
injuries to the corporation, English law recognized that,
135. See Foss, 67 Eng. Rep. at 203, 2 Hare at 492-94 (stating “that the
directors are made the governing body, subject to the superior control of the
proprietors assembled in general meetings . . . [which has power] to originate
proceedings for any purpose within the scope of the company’s powers, as well
as to control the directors in any acts which they may have originated”).
136. Id. at 203, 207-08, 2 Hare at 493, 504 (citing Preston v. Grand Collier
Dock Co., (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Vice Ch.) 907; 11 Sim. 327, 346-47).
137. See, e.g., Russell v. Wakefield Waterworks Co., [1875] 20 L.R. Eq. 474
(construing Foss to permit shareholders to sue only when the alleged acts were
ultra vires, or the acts were committed by the majority shareholders against the
minority shareholders.); Atwool v. Merryweather, [1867] 5 L.R. Eq. 464
(construing Foss to permit shareholders to sue the majority shareholders for
managerial fraud); see also Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside
Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1404 (2006) (stating
the exceptions included fraud on minority shareholders and ultra vires conduct).
138. Skeel, supra note 15, at 168.
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because the board of directors decided when a company
would sue, the directors were not likely to bring a lawsuit
against themselves.139 English law thus created an exception
to the necessary parties rule that permitted a shareholder
to bring a suit on behalf of the company for ultra vires or
oppressive acts, but otherwise the English courts would not
supervise companies.140
In the middle of the 19th century, the English
Parliament passed a series of legislation addressing both
substantive and procedural problems of corporations, jointstock companies, and friendly societies, which altered the
laws originally created through common law development
by the courts of England.141 Thereafter, the cases concerning
such entities did not involve questions of group litigation,
and group litigation “fell into desuetude.”142 Though the
derivative action was a procedure still available in English
courts, such lawsuits were extremely uncommon and did
not play a “significant role” in British law after 1850.143 The
139. Cheffins & Black, supra note 137, at 1404. Occasionally new directors
would bring proceedings when the former directors departed. Id.
140. Lord v. Copper Miners’ Co., (1848) 47 Eng. Rep. 1337 (Ch.) 1342; 1 H. &
Tw. 85, 99 (“If a Court of Equity were to assume jurisdiction in such a case,
could it do so without opening its doors to all parties interested in corporations,
or joint stock companies, or private partnerships, who, although a small
minority of the body to which they belong, may wish to interfere with the
conduct of the majority? This cannot be done; and the attempt to introduce such
a remedy ought to be checked, for the benefit of the community.”); see also
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Bowley, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2263, (2004) 1
B.C.L.C. 180, 188-89.
141. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 194; see also Katharina Pistor et al., The
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 791, 798 (2002) (citing Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89
(Eng.)).
142. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 194-95; see also id. at 197 (noting that group
litigation had vanished by the middle of the twentieth century).
143. Id. at 211-12; see also Skeel, supra note 15, at 168 (“Derivative litigation
has always been extremely uncommon in England, and it remains so today.”);
Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part
Two: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and
Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2008 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 26 (2008) (“The circumstances in which this [derivative suit] can be
done . . . are so obscure and difficult to establish that the derivative action is
virtually non-existent in England.”).
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shareholder derivative action essentially disappeared until
the adoption of the Companies Act of 2006,144 which
statutorily permitted shareholder derivative lawsuits for
the first time.145
II. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION IN COURTS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
After achieving independence from England, courts in
the United States continued to follow the English necessary
parties rule and its exceptions. The earliest examples
involved class action type lawsuits, but the same principles
were soon applied to lawsuits brought by shareholders in
corporations created under state law.
A. The Necessary Parties Rule and Class Actions in the
United States
In the 1820 case of West v. Randall,146 Justice Joseph
Story famously summarized the necessary parties rule and
its exceptions as recognized by courts in England and in the
United States, providing extensive citations to opinions of
both countries.147 The plaintiff was an heir of William West,
suing the survivors of four trustees for an account of
property which was allegedly conveyed to them by William
West in trust for payment of his debts.148 The plaintiff
144. Companies
Act,
2006,
c.
46
(U.K.),
available
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf.

at

145. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, Part 11, § 260(1)-(3) (U.K.) (defining a
derivative claim as a proceeding by a shareholder “in respect of a cause of action
vested in the company, and []seeking relief on behalf of the company”; stating a
derivative claim “may be brought only in respect of a cause of action arising
from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach
of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company”). For more information
on the new Companies Act of 2006 and comparisons to current U.S. shareholder
derivative law, see Ann M. Scarlett, Imitation or Improvement? The Evolution of
Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 569, 590-604 (2011).
146. West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424).
147. Id. at 721-24.
148. Id. at 721.

2013] SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION

861

claimed an eleventh of the resulting surplus, but he did not
join the other heirs of William West or the personal
representative as parties.149 The defendant’s answer insisted
the other heirs were necessary parties.150 Justice Story
stated that “it is a general rule in equity that all those
materially interested . . . in the subject of a bill . . . ought to
be made parties,” and then he proceeded to examine the
exceptions to the rule.151 After a lengthy consideration of
“the doctrine as to making parties,” Justice Story held the
defendants’ objection was well-founded.152
Five years later, in Elmendorf v. Taylor,153 the U.S.
Supreme Court elaborated on the nature of the necessary
parties rule in response to the defendant’s objection that a
tenant may not sue without joining his co-tenants in a
lawsuit concerning the law of land surveys.154 The Court
held that it was not a jurisdiction question, but rather a
question of Court policy.
Courts of equity require, that all the parties concerned in interest
shall be brought before them, that the matter in controversy may
be finally settled. This equitable rule, however, is framed by the
Court itself, and is subject to its discretion. It is not, like the
description of parties, an inflexible rule, a failure to observe which
turns the party out of Court, because it has no jurisdiction over
his cause; but, being introduced by the Court itself, for the
purposes of justice, is susceptible of modification for the promotion
155
of those purposes.

The court required “the plaintiff to do all in his power to
bring every person concerned in interest before the Court,”
but in its discretion permitted the case to proceed even if
such persons could not be joined because the process of the
court could not reach them.156
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 721.
152. Id. at 723-24.
153. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152 (1825).
154. Id. at 166-67.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 167.
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in another opinion written by
Justice Story, addressed the necessary parties rule in the
context of an unincorporated association in Mandeville v.
Riggs157 in 1829. The defendants were stockholders in the
Merchant’s Bank of Alexandria, which failed a year after its
inception.158 The plaintiff had not joined all of the
stockholders, and some deceased stockholders were not
replaced by representatives in the lawsuit.159 The Supreme
Court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff on grounds of
defect of parties and remanded the case so that all
shareholders, and representatives of deceased shareholders,
could be brought before the court.160 The Court stated that it
was not necessary in all cases to bring all stockholders
before the court: “It is well known, that there are cases in
which a court of equity dispenses with such a proceeding
when the parties are very numerous, or unknown, and the
adoption of the rule would essentially impede, if not defeat
the purposes of justice.”161 Here, however, the Court held
that the exception did not apply because, if the decree
against the defendants was valid, they would be entitled to
contribution from the other shareholders, who would be
entitled to “controvert every material fact upon which the
decree was founded” in a later contribution suit.162 Thus, the
other shareholders should have been joined to prevent
“multiplicity of suits.”163
The 1829 case of Beatty v. Kurtz164 was another U.S.
Supreme Court opinion written by Justice Story.165 The
157. Mandeville v. Riggs, 27 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 482, 482 (1829). Mandeville v.
Riggs and West v. Randall show the class action device was well-recognized by
federal courts before adoption of Federal Equity Rule 48. Joseph J. Simeone,
Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REV. 905, 910 & n.27 (1962).
158. Mandeville, 27 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 484-85.
159. Id. at 482-83, 486.
160. Id. at 486-87, 490-91.
161. Id. at 487.
162. Id. at 487-88.
163. Id.
164. Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 566 (1829).
165. Id. at 578.
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original plaintiffs were trustees of the German Lutheran
church of Georgetown and sued “in behalf of themselves and
the members of the said church.”166 They sued two
defendants to quiet title to their church and cemetery.
Among other objections, the defendants denied the
authority of plaintiffs to sue, “declaring them to be mere
volunteers, and demanding proof of their authority.”167 On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could
maintain the bill.168 The court stated that it was not
necessary to consider whether the plaintiffs had authority,
because this was “one of those cases, in which certain
persons, belonging to a voluntary society; and having a
common interest, may sue in behalf of themselves and
others having the like interest.”169 The Court thus applied
an exception to the necessary parties rule in an action that
today would be classified as a class action.
In 1838, Justice Story published his Commentaries on
Equity Pleadings170 in which he expanded his analysis of the
necessary parties rule and its exceptions.171 In a later
edition of Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, Justice Story
described the “proper and necessary parties rule” as “a
general rule in Equity (subject to certain exceptions, which
will hereafter be noticed), that all persons materially
interested, either legally, or beneficially, in the subjectmatter of a suit, are to be made parties to it, either as
plaintiffs, or as defendants, however numerous they may be,
so that there may be a complete decree, which shall bind
them all.”172 By a complete decree between the parties,
Justice Story noted the court may prevent a multiplicity of
166. Id. at 579.
167. Id. at 580.
168. Id. at 582, 585.
169. Id. at 585.
170. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS AND THE INCIDENTS
THERETO §§ 72-238, at 61-168 (London, A. Maxwell, Bell Yard 1838).
171. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS AND THE INCIDENTS
THEREOF §§ 72-238, at 85-282 (Boston, Charles C. Little and James Brown, 4th
ed. 1848).
172. Id. § 72, at 86; see also West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I.
1820) (citing GILBERT’S FORUM ROMANUM 157).
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lawsuits and ensure that no injustice is done by taking a
partial view of the merits of the case.173 This was contrary to
the rule observed in courts of law that only “the persons
directly and immediately interested in the subject-matter of
the suit, and whose interests are of a strictly legal nature,
should be parties to it.”174 Story stated that the purpose of
the necessary parties rule was to achieve justice and was
based on public convenience, but that the “Courts of Equity
will not suffer [the rule] to be so applied as to defeat the
very purposes of justice, if they can dispose of the merits of
the case before them without prejudice to the rights or
interests of other persons, who are not parties, or if the
circumstances of the case render the application of the rule
wholly impracticable.”175
Justice Story then explained the exceptions to the
necessary parties rule including the representative
exception, among others.176 In discussing these exceptions,
Story noted that both the general rule and the exceptions
were motivated by equitable principles: rules being
established for the convenient administration of justice
should not be followed when they are incapable of being
applied.177 In these situations, granting relief to the plaintiff
without making the other persons parties was a lesser evil
than to “wholly deny the plaintiff the equitable relief, to
173. STORY, supra note 171, § 72, at 87; see also West, 29 F. Cas. at 721 (citing,
among others, Cockburn v. Thompson, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves.
Jun. 321).
174. STORY, supra note 171, § 76, at 91.
175. Id. § 77, at 101 (stating “the object of the general rule is to accomplish the
purposes of justice between all the parties in interest, and it is a rule founded,
in some sort, upon public convenience and policy”); see also West, 29 F. Cas. at
722-23 (citing Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves.
Jun. 429, and Cockburn, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005; 16 Ves. Jun. 321, for the proposition
that the necessary parties rule is adopted merely for convenience and may be
dispensed with when compliance is impracticable).
176. Other exceptions include cases where one party is out of the jurisdiction,
or where joinder of certain parties destroys diversity jurisdiction. STORY, supra
note 171, §§ 78-79, at 102-04; see also Milligan v. Milledge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
220, 228 (1805) (holding that a want of proper parties was not a good plea when
the parties are out of the jurisdiction of the court).
177. STORY, supra note 171, § 96, at 121.
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which he is entitled.”178 To achieve justice in these cases, the
court “will generally require the Bill to be filed, not only in
behalf of the plaintiff, but also in behalf of all other persons
interested, who are not directly made parties (although in a
sense they are thus made so), so that they may come in
under the decree, and take the benefit of it, or show it to be
erroneous, or entitle themselves to a rehearing.”179 Story
also mentioned that in these situations, courts will
entertain bills bringing “the rights and interests of the
absent parties” before the court if there is any danger “of
injury or injustice to them.”180
Story listed three sets of cases falling within the
representation exception. First, “where the question is one
of a common or general interest, and one or more sue, or
defend for the benefit of the whole,” such as a lawsuit
brought by a few ship crew members on behalf of the whole
crew.181 This class of cases would also include suits brought
on behalf of many persons including some who cannot be
easily found.182 For instance, creditors may bring a suit on
behalf of themselves and all the other creditors seeking an
account of the estate of a deceased debtor to obtain payment
from his representative, and then the other creditors may
“come in under the decree” and prove their debts to the
judge.183
The second set of cases within the representation
exception included “where the parties form a voluntary
association for public or private purposes, and those, who
sue, or defend, may fairly be presumed to represent the
rights and interests of the whole.”184 Thus, a few members of
178. Id.
179. Id. § 96, at 122 (emphasis added).
180. Id. § 96, at 122-23.
181. Id. §§ 97-98, at 123-25.
182. Id. § 99, at 125; see also id. §§ 99-103, at 125-34.
183. Id. § 99, at 125-27. Another example is suits by legatees seeking relief
against executors may sue on behalf of themselves and other legatees. Id. §§
104-106, at 134-39.
184. Id. § 97, at 123; see also West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 722 (C.C.D.R.I.
1820).
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a voluntary society or unincorporated body of proprietors
were allowed to sue on behalf of the rest, seeking relief
against their own agents.185 Because such associations
commonly involved numerous persons with privity of
interest and joinder of all them would be exceedingly
inconvenient, courts allowed representation by some of the
parties on behalf of themselves and all the others, “taking
care, that there shall be a due representation of all
substantial interests before the Court.”186 “[S]uch a Bill
must be brought on behalf of all the parties in interest; for if
it be brought for the plaintiffs alone, it will not be sustained
by the Court for the want of proper parties.”187 This
exception applied when the members of an association or
proprietors were sued as defendants or plaintiffs.188
For the third set of cases within the representation
exception, Justice Story included those “where the parties
are very numerous, and although they have, or may have,
separate distinct interests; yet it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court.”189 This exception applied where
the parties were “exceedingly numerous, and it would be
impracticable to join them without almost interminable
delays, and other inconveniences, which would obstruct, and
probably defeat the purposes of justice.”190 In such cases
where the parties were too numerous to make it practicable
to prosecute the suit if they were all made parties, the court
dispensed with them if a decree could be rendered without
injury to the absent persons (generally when their interests
were only “incidentally and indirectly affected” by the
185. STORY, supra note 171, § 108, at 141-42.
186. Id. § 107, at 141; see also id. § 108, at 141-42 (discussing Chancey v. May,
(1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592.); id. § 109, at 142 (discussing Hichens v.
Congreve, (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.) 922; 4 Russ. 562, 576); id. § 115, at 146
(discussing Small v. Atwood, (1832) 159 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ch.) 1052; You. 407,
408).
187. STORY, supra note 171, § 107, at 141.
188. Id. §§ 116-119, at 149-52.
189. Id. § 97, at 123-24; see also id. § 120, at 152.
190. Id. § 94, at 119 (citing, among others, Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32
Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves. Jun. 429 and Cockburn v. Thompson, (1809) 33
Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves. Jun. 321); see also id. § 95, at 120-21.
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decree).191 “In this class of cases, there is usually a privity of
interest between the parties,” or at least “a common
interest, or a common right, which the Bill seeks to
establish and enforce.”192 In most of these cases, the
resulting decree “will ordinarily be held binding upon all
other persons standing in the same predicament,” and thus
the court must ensure that adequate representatives exist
to “honestly, fairly, and fully” try the right.193 In these
circumstances, when a few were permitted to represent
themselves and all others and “the decree must directly
affect the interests” of the absent persons, they had a right
“to be heard before the decree is made.”194
It has often been said that Justice Story “in a clear but
indirect way, virtually created the American law of class
suits.”195 His analysis of the necessary parties rule and the
exceptions to the rule in Commentaries on Equity Pleading
were essentially codified when the Supreme Court
promulgated the Federal Equity Rules 47 and 48 in 1842.196
[Rule 47:] In all cases where it shall appear to the court, that
persons, who might otherwise be deemed necessary or proper
parties to the suit, cannot be made parties by reason of their being
out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable otherwise of being
made parties, or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction
of the court as to the parties before the court, the court may in
their discretion proceed in the case without making such persons
parties; and in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to
the rights of the absent parties.
[Rule 48:] Where the parties on either side are very numerous,
and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays
in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion may
191. STORY, supra note 171, § 94, at 119-20.
192. Id. § 120, at 152; see also id. § 126, at 158-59.
193. Id. § 120, at 152-53.
194. Id. § 130, at 162.
195. Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1878; see also YEAZELL, supra note 24, at
216 (describing Joseph Story’s role in the promotion of group litigation in
America).
196. See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational
Device?, 1983 SUPREME CT. REV. 459, 460-61 (1983); YEAZELL, supra note 24, at
221.
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dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the
suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse
interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly
before it. But in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice
197
to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.

The Supreme Court, however, continued to rely on the
common law interpretations of the necessary parties rule
and its exceptions in interpreting Federal Equity Rules 47
and 48.
Relying on the common law of the necessary parties
rule, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Swormstedt198 in 1853
ignored the last line of Rule 48, regarding the res judicata
effect of a class decree. In Swormstedt, the bill to recover a
share of a fund was filed by a number of preachers, on
behalf of themselves and the rest of the traveling 1,500
preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church South.199 The
case also involved a group of defendants as the bill was filed
against several preachers of the newly-split Methodist
Episcopal Church North on behalf of its 3,800 preachers.200
The defendants objected for want of parties, and the
plaintiffs argued that each of these numerous preachers had
“an interest in the fund in the same right, so that it is
impossible . . . to make them all parties to the bill.”201 The
Court held the objection was improper. 202 Citing Story’s
Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, the Court declared it a
well-established rule that “where the parties interested are
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all,
some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of
themselves and of the others; and a bill may also be
maintained against a portion of a numerous body of
defendants, representing a common interest.”203 Again citing
197. 42 U.S. (1 How.), at lv-lvi (1843).
198. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302-03 (1853); see also
Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1901.
199. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 298, 300.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 300, 302.
202. Id. at 302.
203. Id. (citing STORY, supra note 171). But see Hazard et al., supra note 38, at
1899 (noting that, while the opinion draws heavily on Story’s Commentaries on
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Story, the Court noted that the rights of the several parties
may be distinct, but there must be “a common interest or a
common right” for the court to enforce.204 It cautioned that
“care must be taken that persons are brought on the record
fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it
may be fully and honestly tried.”205 Directly contradicting
the last sentence of Federal Equity Rule 48, the Court also
stated that “the decree binds all of them the same as if all
were before the court.”206 The Court declared that the
representation exception to the necessary parties rule
applied, because to require that all the parties must be
joined would essentially amount to “a denial of justice.”207
The general trend in state and federal cases in the late
1800s was to allow representation when there was a
common interest between the party and the absent person,
but holding that “common question” representation was not
sufficient.208 For example, in Mason v. York & Cumberland
Railroad Company,209 the Maine Supreme Court allowed
one bondholder on behalf of all bondholders to pursue a bill
to recover the mortgage securing the bonds because, while
bondholders are numerous and constantly changing, their
interest is homogenous.210 The court also noted that if no
representation were allowed the plaintiff would be without
remedy, but recognized that it must “carefully guard” the

Equity Pleadings, it “took no note of the qualifications and uncertainties that
Story expressed in his treatise” regarding the binding effects of such
judgments).
204. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 302 (citing STORY, supra note 171); see
also Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1899 (noting this phrase, from Story’s
Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, became a formula for courts to identify a
representative suit with binding effect).
205. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 303 (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., In re Engelhard & Sons Co., 231 U.S. 646, 649-52 (1914);
Hutchinson, supra note 196, at 467-69.
209. Mason v. York & Cumberland R.R. Co., 52 Me. 82 (1861).
210. Id. at 108-09 (citing STORY, supra note 171 and Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 288).
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interests of the absent parties.211 By contrast, the court in
Cutting v. Gilbert212 did not allow representation because
the only matter in common was an interest in the question
involved.213 Six brokerage firms, on behalf of themselves and
all others doing business as brokers, had filed a lawsuit
against a tax assessor seeking to enjoin the collection of a
certain tax.214 The defendants objected that there was not a
joint interest that would allow the plaintiffs to represent the
rest.215 The court agreed, stating that the interest required
was an interest in the subject matter of the suit, not merely
an interest in the answering of a legal question.216
In 1912, the Supreme Court promulgated revisions to
the Federal Equity Rules. The revisions made the decree in
a class suit binding on absent parties, as had been held in
Swormstedt, and also permitted common question
representation.217 Then in 1938, the Supreme Court
211. Id. at 107-09.
212. Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 F. Cas. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1865).
213. Id. at 1080.
214. Id. at 1079-80.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1080; see also Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 116-17 (1897) (plaintiff
sought an injunction in a bill filed on behalf of himself and all others in South
Carolina who import alcohol from other states for their own use; court held that
merely a common interest in the question is not enough to support
representation).
217. The text of the revised Federal Equity Rules 38 and 39 reads as follows:
Rule 38. Representatives of Class: When the question is one of common
or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the whole.
Rule 39. Absence of Persons who would be Proper Parties: In all cases
where it shall appear to the court that persons, who might otherwise be
deemed proper parties to the suit, can not be made parties by reason of
their being out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable otherwise of
being made parties, or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction
of the court as to the parties before the court, the court may, in its
discretion, proceed in the cause without making such persons parties;
and in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights of
the absent parties.
226 U.S. 659.
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promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
merged law and equity for the first time.218 Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 specifically codified class actions and
Rule 23, as revised in 1966, is substantially the same as
today’s rule.219 Justice Story’s classification of class actions
arguably endures to modern times through Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.220
B. Recognition of Shareholder Actions in the United States
Commentators have often said that U.S. courts
imported the shareholder derivative device from England,221
but that is not entirely accurate. Unlike in England,
American courts have “never limited shareholder litigation
to cases involving ultra vires acts” or oppressive acts by a
controlling majority.222 However, unlike English courts,223
American courts restricted shareholders to filing lawsuits
only in situations in which the corporation was incapable of
seeking redress or improperly refused to seek redress. Even
with that restriction, shareholders have been able to pursue
derivative actions far more easily in the United States than
in England.224
1. Shareholder Litigation in the State Courts. The
Louisiana Supreme Court appears to have decided the first
shareholder action in the United States in 1829. In Percy v.
Millaudon,225 the plaintiffs were stockholders in Planters’
218. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
219. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Notes.
220. Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1878 (noting that Story’s Commentaries
on Equity Pleadings influenced the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in
1938 and is still embedded in Rule 23).
221. See, e.g., Howson, supra note 21, at 47.
222. Skeel, supra note 15, at 168.
223. England has never required shareholders to make a demand on the
directors. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 261(1) (U.K.) (requiring a shareholder
filing a derivative claim only to “apply to the court for permission . . . to continue
it”); Kurt A. Goehre, Is the Demand Requirement Obsolete? How the United
Kingdom Modernized Its Shareholder Derivative Procedure and What the United
States Can Learn from It, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 140, 142-43 (2010).
224. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 15, at 168-69.
225. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
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Bank, which was incorporated by act of the Louisiana
Territory Legislature,226 and they sued three of the directors
for fraudulent and unfaithful conduct.227 This case
demonstrates that U.S. courts, similar to the English
courts, were applying the necessary parties rule and its
exceptions to class actions as well as shareholder lawsuits.
Several stockholders had refused to join the plaintiffs’
petition, so the trial court stated that they “were necessarily
made parties to the suit in order that a final settlement
should be made between all, having an interest in the
institution.”228 The Louisiana Supreme Court summarized
the case as being brought by the owners of 413 shares and
that the other stockholders who had declined to become
plaintiffs were joined as defendants “for no other purpose,
than that of having all the stockholders in court.” 229 This
case is typically cited by scholars as the earliest example of
a court stating that directors’ decisions are entitled to
deference.230 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court found
that the directors were “much influenced by a view to
promote the interest of a few individuals” in voting to allow
the president to discount notes in contravention of the
corporate charter and ultimately held the defendants liable
for their acts.231
Similarly, in Taylor v. Miami Exporting Company,232 the
Ohio Supreme Court allowed a stockholder of a bank to
pursue a bill in equity against the corporation and its
directors, with other stockholders not joining the suit
The
plaintiff
alleged
aligned
as
defendants.233
mismanagement and fraud by the president and directors of
the Miami Exporting Company, which had been
226. Percy v. Millaudon, 3 La. 568, 568-69 (1832).
227. Percy, 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 68.
228. Id. at 71.
229. Percy, 3 La. at 568, 570.
230. See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97-98 (1979).
231. Percy, 3 La. at 580.
232. Taylor v. Miami Exp. Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831).
233. Id. at 168-69.
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incorporated in 1803.234 After noting that the bill did not put
into issue the life of the corporation nor interrupt the
exercise of its corporate functions, the court stated that the
corporation was not exempt from legal responsibility.235 “We
cannot believe the powers of this court to be so feeble as not
to reach a case of such palpable fraud . . . .”236 Therefore, the
court held that the stockholder could sustain a bill in equity
against the corporation and its directors, with the other
stockholders named as defendants.237
The first U.S. lawsuit in which shareholders were
permitted to bring a representative action on behalf of
themselves and the other shareholders against the
corporation’s directors was the 1832 case of Robinson v.
Smith.238 Stockholders in the New York Coal Company, a
company incorporated in 1824, filed an equitable action
against the directors for fraud and mismanagement.239
Although the company had received its corporate charter for
the purpose of exploring for, digging, and vending coal and
was restricted from carrying on any banking business, the
stockholders claimed that the directors had used their funds
almost exclusively to buy and sell stocks in other
corporations.240 Noting that the plaintiffs owned only 160 of
the company’s 4,000 shares of stock, the defendants
demurred, arguing that all the shareholders needed to be
joined.241 The court held that the objection could not be
sustained.242 All the complainants were cestui que trusts,
having the same interest in every respect: “They are seeking
precisely the same redress against their trustees, and for
the same acts; by which they allege they have received a
234. Id. at 162-63.
235. Id. at 166-68.
236. Id. at 167.
237. Id. at 168-69.
238. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
239. Id. at 222-23.
240. Id. at 222, 228 (Chancellor described this conduct as stock jobbing at its
wildest).
241. Id. at 224.
242. Id. at 230-31.
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similar and common injury.”243 Thus, the court held that
there was no reason to file separate bills.244 The court
recognized that generally a suit to compel corporate officers
to account for their actions should be in the name of the
corporation, but stated that it should not permit a wrong to
go unredressed merely for the sake of form.245 The court
stated that if the “corporation refused to prosecute” or “was
still under the control of” the defendants, the stockholders
“would be permitted to file a bill in their own names” and on
behalf of all the shareholders, with the corporation being
made a defendant.246 “[I]f the stockholders are so numerous
as to render it impossible, or very inconvenient to bring
them all before the court, a part[y] might file a bill in behalf
of themselves and all others standing in the same
situation.”247 The court then declared it the law of the state
that directors of corporations “who willfully abuse their
trust, or misapply the funds of the company, by which a loss
is sustained, are personally liable as trustees to make good
that loss.”248
The New York Chancery Court again summarized when
stockholders could pursue an action in their own names in
Forbes v. Whitlock249 in 1840.
Cases have occurred in which stockholders have been at liberty to
exhibit a bill in their own names. This can be done when the
directors, officers or managers, having the control of the
corporation and its affairs, are guilty of misconduct that amounts
250
to a breach of their duty as trustees.

However, the court held that if the complaint was not
against the board of directors but simply a single member,

243. Id. at 230-31.
244. Id. (citing Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 7 Johns. Ch. 217 (N.Y. Ch. 1822)).
245. Id. at 233.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 231.
249. Forbes v. Whitlock, 3 Edw. Ch. 446, 448 (N.Y. Ch. 1840).
250. Id. at 448.
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then “the corporation itself has the exclusive right to sue.”251
Thus, the stockholders’ lawsuit alleging fraudulent acts
against a single director could not be brought by the
stockholders independently.252
Shareholders’ right to file suit when the corporation is
incapable of doing so or improperly refuses to do so was also
recognized in Maine in 1844. In Hersey v. Veazie,253 a
shareholder sued an agent of the corporation for fraud in
causing the franchise of the corporation to be sold.254 The
court held that the wrongs alleged were wrongs committed
against the corporation and, until it has been shown that
the corporation is incapable of doing so, no shareholder can
assume the right of the corporation to obtain redress for
such wrongs.255 The court noted that, if after attempting to
get the corporation to make redress, it was found incapable
of doing it or improperly refused to do so, the shareholders
may bring suit by making the corporation a party
defendant.256 In this case, however, there was no allegation
that the corporation had refused to call upon the defendant
to account for the harm done.257
In 1855, the Maine Supreme Court again addressed the
issue. In Smith v. Poor,258 the court stated that a
shareholder could not bring bill in equity “against the
officers for misfeasance, until proper measures have been
taken to induce the corporation to obtain redress, and they
improperly refuse.”259 However, if the corporation was under
251. Id. at 447-48.
252. Id. at 448.
253. Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Me. 9 (1844).
254. Id. at 11.
255. Id. at 12.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 13.
258. Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415 (1855) (holding shareholder’s claim that
directors fraudulently prevented the execution of his contract could be asserted
only against the company, not the directors).
259. Id. at 418 (citing Hersey, 24 Me.); id. at 421 (stating that if an injury
resulted to the plaintiff in common with other stockholders, the remedy would
be by the corporation because directors are responsible to the corporation for
misconduct in the discharge of their duties).
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the control of guilty parties, the court stated that the
remedy would be by “some of the injured stockholders for
the benefit of all.”260 In all cases, the court noted that “the
corporation is a necessary party either as complainants or
defendants.”261
In 1866, the Maine Supreme Court elaborated on when
shareholders could bring suit in Kennebec & Portland R.R.
Co. v. Portland & Kennebec R.R. Co.262 The complainants
alleged that the directors carelessly, negligently, and
unskillfully managed the company, and that the net
earnings were $50,000 less annually than had the company
been managed faithfully.263
The corporation itself is regarded as a distinct person; and its
property is legally vested in itself, and not in its stockholders. As
individuals, they cannot, even by joining together unanimously,
convey a title to it, or maintain an action at law for its possession,
or for damages done to it. The . . . corporation must manage its
affairs in its own name, as exclusively as a natural person
manages his property and business. The officers, though chosen
by a vote of the stockholders, are not their agents, but the agents
of the corporation, and they are accountable to it alone.”
Stockholders undoubtedly have an interest in the property
and business of the corporation, which will be protected in equity
when invaded. They have equitable rights which, when violated,
may be enforced by equitable remedies. “The corporation itself
holds its property as trustee for the stockholders, who have a joint
interest in all its property and effects, and each of whom is related
to it as cestui que trust.” So long as the corporation is faithful to its
trust, the stockholders, as individuals, have no occasion and no
right to resort to or enforce any remedies, legal or equitable, to
vindicate any injury to the corporate property. When it is guilty of
a breach of trust, then, and only then, the relationship of the
stockholders, arising from that trust, gives them a right to pursue
the proper remedy to vindicate their rights. But, in such a case, it
necessarily follows that the corporation must, or at least may be, a
party defendant; for it is only the violation of the trust existing

260. Id. at 420.
261. Id. at 422.
262. Kennebec & Portland R.R. Co. v. Portland & Kennebec R.R. Co, 54 Me.
173 (1866).
263. Id. at 176.
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between the corporation and its stockholders, that gives the latter
264
any occasion for a remedy.

The court found the bill defective for misjoinder of plaintiffs
because there was no allegation the corporation had
breached its trust with stockholders.265
Massachusetts
subsequently
followed
Maine’s
formulation of when to permit shareholder litigation.
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not allow a
stockholder of a bank to pursue an action against the
directors for negligence in conducting the bank’s affairs in
Smith v. Hurd266 in 1847, it stated that shareholders could
pursue litigation when the corporation failed to do so or was
incapable of doing so.267 The stockholder had alleged
nonfeasance and misfeasance led the bank to fail.268 The
court held that no legal privity existed between the
shareholder and the directors,269 because the directors’
duties arose from a promise to the corporation, not to the
stockholders.270 The court stated that the directors were
agents and the corporation was the principal, and therefore
a stockholder could not call the corporation’s “agents to
account, by a bill in equity, without the consent of the
corporation legally obtained.”271 However, the court
recognized an exception: a stockholder could bring a bill in

264. Id. at 181 (citation omitted) (quoting Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. (6 Allen)
52, 55-56 (1863)).
265. Id. at 1882.
266. Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847).
267. Id. at 377-78.
268. Id. at 375.
269. Id. at 384.
270. Id. at 373.
271. Id. at 377-78 (“As the corporation may have a single action for the whole
injury alleged to have been done by the defendants, there is no reason why each
stockholder should have an action; and as no stockholder can have suffered any
special damage, that is, any damage not also suffered by the others, the
analogies of the law would seem to confine the remedy to a single action by a
party that can recover for the whole injury.”).
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equity when “the corporation is incapable of obtaining
redress, or collusively refuses to seek it.”272
The Massachusetts Supreme Court reiterated this
principle in Peabody v. Flint273 in 1863 and in Brewer v.
Boston Theatre274 in 1870. In Peabody, two stockholders filed
a bill in equity on behalf of themselves and the other
stockholders of the Lowell and Salem Railroad Company
alleging conspiracy and fraud against certain directors and
agents of the company.275 Although acknowledging
stockholders’ interest was merely an equitable interest, the
court stated that an equitable interest possessed equitable
rights that may be enforced by equitable remedies.276
The corporation may call its officers to account if they willfully
abuse their trust, or misapply the funds of the company; and if it
refuses to sue, or is still under the control of those who must be
made defendants in the suit, the stockholders who are the real
parties in interest may file a bill in their own names, making the
corporation a party defendant; or a part of them may file a bill in
behalf of themselves and all others standing in the same
277
relation.

This bill, however, was ultimately dismissed for
unreasonable delay.278
The shareholders in Brewer v. Boston Theatre alleged
that several directors of the corporation leased its property
to parties whom they secretly had agreed to share in the
advantages of such leases.279 To pursue their lawsuit, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had
to show that redress cannot be obtained through action of
the corporation and plaintiff must have applied to the board

272. Id. at 378.
273. Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 52 (1863).
274. Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870).
275. Peabody, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) at 52.
276. Id. at 56.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 57-58.
279. Brewer, 104 Mass. at 378.
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to bring an action and the board must have refused. 280 “It is
only from the necessity of the case, and to prevent a failure
of justice, that suits in equity in the form of these bills are
allowed.”281 The court recognized that there was “some
diversity” as to what satisfied the requirement that suitable
redress was not attainable through the action of the
corporation.282 It held that where stockholders retain no
control of the corporate business, except by annual elections
of officers, a simple refusal by the officers to take proper
action to protect the corporation’s interests should be
sufficient to allow a lawsuit on behalf of the stockholders.”283
In what could be an early statement of the demand excusal
test, the court stated, “[a] formal application and refusal
need not be alleged, if enough appears to show that such an
application would be unavailing.”284 The court found that
because the majority of the corporation was under the
control of the defendants being accused and the alleged
breaches of trusts by the defendants could not be ratified by
the corporation, there was no capacity for the plaintiffs to
move the corporation to take action for their redress.285
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1849 permitted
shareholders to bring an action on behalf of themselves and
the other shareholders in Putnam v. Sweet.286 The plaintiffs
(about twenty in number) filed a bill on behalf of themselves
and subscribers to the stock of Milwaukee and Janesville
Plank Road Company, chartered on March 6, 1848.287 The
complainants alleged the directors permitted the fraudulent
subscription of thousands of shares.288 The court held that it
was not necessary for all the shareholders to be made

280. Id. at 386.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 387.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 396.
286. Putnam v. Sweet, 2 Pin. 302 (Wis. 1849).
287. Id. at 302-09.
288. Id. at 325.
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parties.289 A few of a large number could maintain a bill in
equity on behalf of themselves and their fellow
shareholders, even when a majority was opposed to the
suit.290 As the court stated, “[a] more appropriate case ‘for
some of a large number having a common right to maintain
a suit in behalf of themselves and fellows, in aid of that
common right,’ cannot well occur.”291
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Hodges v. New
England Screw Company292 permitted stockholders to sue
directors for mismanagement.293 The court noted that the
corporation was the party injured by breaches of trust by its
managers and thus was the primary party to sue for such
acts, but held that the stockholders in their individuals
names could bring suit when the corporation refused to
sue.294 On the merits, the court held that the directors had
acted in good faith for the benefit of the company and under
the belief that their actions were lawful.295
The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized an
exception to the necessary parties rule for shareholders in
Allen v. Curtis296 in 1857. Stockholders of a bank brought an
action at law against the corporation’s directors alleging
that the directors willfully managed the corporation’s
affairs in an “unskillful, careless, and reckless manner.” 297
The court recognized the principle that directors are agents
of the corporation and only liable to it, and that the
corporation is the sole representative of the stockholder. 298
However, the court noted that an individual stockholder, on
289. Id. at 345.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850).
293. Id. at 340-41.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 344.
296. Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456 (1857).
297. Id. at 457. The alleged actions included “making false entries in the books
of the bank [and] loaning money without security.” Id.
298. Id. at 461.
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behalf of himself and all the stockholders, may bring suit in
equity if “the corporation is unable to bring suit, or if,
through fraud and collusion, the directors refuse or neglect
to bring suit in the corporate name.”299 Because there was no
allegation that through fraud or collusion the corporation
refused to sue, the suit was not allowed.300
In March v. Eastern Railroad Company,301 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that stockholders, on behalf
of themselves and all the stockholders, had a remedy in
equity against the directors and the corporation to prevent
any misapplication of the corporation’s assets.302 Railroad A
had leased part of the railroad track owned by Railroad B
but then refused to pay rent.303 When the board of Railroad
B refused to take measures to collect the rent payments,
stockholders in Railroad B brought suit against their own
corporation, its directors, and the corporation of Railroad
A.304 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not
proper parties to bring suit because all the stockholders
were not made parties.305 However, the court held that it
was a “well settled” principle that when the parties are
numerous, and “the suit is for an object common to them all,
some of the body may maintain a bill in behalf of
themselves and others having a like interest.”306
Furthermore, the court noted that it was no longer doubted
that courts of equity have “jurisdiction over corporations, at
the instance of one or more of their members, to apply
preventative remedies by injunction.”307 Citing Robinson v.
Smith, the court stated that, “[i]f the directors of a
corporation refuse to prosecute, . . . the stockholders, who

299. Id. at 461-62.
300. Id. at 462.
301. March v. Eastern R.R. Co., 40 N.H. 548 (1860).
302. Id. at 548.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 566.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 567.
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are the real parties in interest, would be permitted to file a
bill in their own names.”308
2. Shareholder Litigation in the Federal Court. Early
shareholder lawsuits in the United States were all decided
by state courts. The U.S. Supreme Court did not address
shareholder actions until Dodge v. Woolsey309 in 1855. In
Dodge, a stockholder filed suit against a third party tax
collector seeking an injunction to prevent the county
treasurer from collecting an allegedly unconstitutional tax
on the corporation, Commercial Branch Bank of
Cleveland.310 The Court allowed the stockholder to step in
between the corporation and a third party to institute and
control a suit concerning the rights of the corporation311
because the directors of the bank had refused to take any
steps to prevent the collection of the tax upon demand of the
stockholder.312 The Court viewed the directors’ action to be a
breach of duty and held the stockholder had a right to bring
suit in equity to restrain the collection of the tax, but it did
not directly address the representative nature of the case.313
The underlying story of this case, and many other early
shareholder cases in the Supreme Court, was that by the
out-of-state shareholder bringing the action, the case could
be filed in federal court on diversity grounds. Diversity
jurisdiction in the federal court was preferable to having a
court of the local government deciding the constitutionality
of the local tax.
In Bronson v. La Cross & Milwaukie Railroad
Company,314 the U.S. Supreme Court again permitted a
stockholder to defend a suit against the company where the
directors refused to do so.315 A plaintiff had filed a bill
against the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company,
308. Id. at 567-68 (citing Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)).
309. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
310. Id. at 335-36.
311. Id. at 341.
312. Id. at 344-45.
313. Id. at 345.
314. Bronson v. La Cross & Milwaukie R.R. Co., 69 U.S. 283 (1864).
315. Id. at 303.
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seeking to foreclose a mortgage of the corporation.316
According to the shareholder who sought to defend the case,
the directors had refused to defend the bill for the
“fraudulent purpose of sacrificing the interests of the
stockholders.”317 The court found that “it would be a
reproach to the law . . . if stockholders were remediless” and
thus used its discretion to “permit a stockholder to become a
party defendant, for the purpose of protecting his own
interest against unfounded or illegal claims against the
company.”318
In Memphis City v. Dean,319 the corporation, Memphis
Gaslight Company, entered into a charter in 1852 that
allegedly gave the company exclusive rights to provide gas
to the city for twenty years.320 However, “[i]n 1866, the State
passed an act incorporating another gaslight company.”321
Memphis Gaslight Company therefore filed a bill in a state
court of chancery against the new corporation, but a
permanent injunction was not granted.322 Following
initiation of the corporation’s lawsuit, a stockholder filed a
bill “against the new company[] and also against the city of
Memphis.”323 Citing Dodge v. Woolsey, the Supreme Court
stated that for the stockholder to have standing, the
stockholder must have demanded that the corporation bring
the lawsuit itself, and the corporation refused.324 The refusal
of the board of directors to institute a suit in the
corporation’s name was essential and there had to be a clear
default involving a breach of duty before a stockholder is

316. Id. at 283.
317. Id. at 302 (“It is thus apparent, that while the name of the corporation is
thus used as a real party in the litigation, so far as the rights and interests of
the complainants are concerned, it is an unreal and fictitious party . . . .”).
318. Id.
319. Memphis City v. Dean, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 64 (1868).
320. Id. at 66.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 66-67.
323. Id. at 67.
324. Id. at 73 (citing Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855)).
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authorized to institute the suit in his own behalf.325
Although the corporation refused to bring the lawsuit that
Dean intended, the corporation argued that its previously
filled complaint was substantially the same.326 The court
dismissed the shareholder’s complaint, holding that the two
actions were substantially similar and the corporation had
not broken its trust to the stockholders.327
In Davenport v. Dows,328 stockholders in the Chicago,
Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad filed a bill to arrest the
collection of a tax on the corporation by the city of
Davenport.329 The Court held that a stockholder may bring a
suit based on the rights of the corporation when the
corporation refused to do so, as was the case here.330
However, the shareholder had failed to make the
corporation a defendant in the action.331 The court noted
that “proceedings for this purpose should be so conducted
that any decree which shall be made on the merits shall
conclude the corporation. This can only be done by making
the corporation a party defendant.”332 If the corporation
were not made a party, the corporation might be able to
bring a later lawsuit if the stockholder was unsuccessful. 333
To avoid this result, the court stated that it would not
“settle a question in which the corporation is the essential
party in interest, unless [the corporation] is made a party to
the litigation” as a defendant.334

325. Id. (citing Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 331); cf. City of Detroit v. Dean,
106 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1883) (holding a stockholder seeking to protect the
property of the corporation against a third party must show a clear breach of
duty by the directors in neglecting or refusing to bring suit).
326. Memphis City, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 74.
327. Id. at 75-76.
328. Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626 (1873).
329. Id. at 626.
330. Id. at 627.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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In Hawes v. Oakland,335 the United States Supreme
Court sought to establish limitations on a shareholder’s
ability to bring derivative actions similar to the limitations
the English court in Foss v. Harbottle had established.336 A
stockholder in the Contra Costa Water-works Company
filed suit on behalf of his interest in the corporation against
the corporation and the city of Oakland for the corporation’s
supply of free water to the city beyond the purposes
prescribed in the charter.337 The plaintiff had urged the
directors of the corporation to take immediate proceedings
to prevent the city from taking water from the works of said
company without compensation for any purpose other than
those listed in the charter, but the directors had refused.338
The court stated that the frequency of such suits by
stockholders after Dodge v. Woolsey had “overburdened
courts of the United States” by a “simulated and
conventional arrangement.”339 The court explained that
through this “arrangement,” shareholders essentially were
colluding with their corporations to bring these suits in
federal court, because the shareholder had the requisite
citizenship for federal diversity jurisdiction that the
corporation whose rights were to be enforced lacked.340 The
court stated that Dodge v. Woolsey had not established a
doctrine different than cases in English courts or other
American courts, and the doctrine enabled a stockholder to
bring an action only if one of the following exists:
Some action or threatened action of the managing board of
directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the
authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of
organization;
Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated
by the acting managers, in connection with some other party, or
335. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
336. Id. at 460 (citing Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.); 2 Hare
461).
337. Id. at 451.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 453.
340. Id. at 452-53.
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among themselves, or with other shareholders as will result in
serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other
shareholders;
Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are
acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the
corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders;
Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are
oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the
corporation, which is in violation of the rights of other
shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a
341
court of equity.

However, “before the shareholder is permitted in his own
name to institute . . . litigation”, he had to show that “he
exhausted all means within his [control] to obtain the
redress of his grievances.”342 The court held that the facts of
Hawes presented “no such case,” because the plaintiff had
merely requested “the directors to desist from furnishing
water free of expense to the city” and had not exhausted all
efforts to obtain the corporation’s action against the city.343
III. UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND MODERN
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The English Court of Chancery in the early 1800s
applied the necessary parties rule and its exceptions to
lawsuits that today would be called class actions and
shareholder derivative actions, as Part I demonstrated.
During that same time period, the courts of the newly
established United States also followed the necessary
parties rule and recognized an exception that permitted
representative lawsuits for similar actions. However, as
Part II explained, the U.S. courts limited when
shareholders could bring actions, and the U.S. limitations
always differed from the limitations imposed on similar
actions in England. Now, Sections A and B below will
341. Id. at 460.
342. Id. at 460-61.
343. Id. at 461.
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explain that the normative foundation of shareholder
derivative litigation in the first 150 years of the United
States varies dramatically from the modern version. Section
C will then examine the likely explanations for the variance
between early and modern shareholder derivative litigation,
and it will suggest the implications that the normative
foundation of early shareholder derivative actions may have
on modern corporate law debates.
A. Shareholders May File an Action “On Behalf of All
Shareholders”
The shared history of class actions and shareholder
derivative actions has long been overlooked, but that history
reveals the early normative justifications for shareholder
litigation. Both class actions and shareholder derivative
actions are forms of representative litigation, meaning that
one or a few persons stand for another or group of
persons.344 Prior to Foss v. Harbottle in 1843, shareholders
in English corporations and joint-stock companies were
allowed to bring actions on behalf of all the shareholders
with almost no limitations.345 Similar to class actions, these
actions were permitted as an exception to the necessary
parties rule. In Foss and subsequent cases, English courts
limited shareholders to bringing suit only when an illegal or
fraudulent act was alleged, or the wrong was committed by
the
majority
shareholders
against
the
minority
346
shareholders.
During the 1800s and early 1900s, shareholders in U.S.
companies were also permitted to bring lawsuits on behalf

344. See supra nn. 16-18 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves.
Jun. 429; Meux v. Maltby, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (Ch.); 2 Swans 277; Hichens
v. Congreve (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.); 4 Russ. 562; Preston v. Grand Collier
Dock Co., (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Vice Ch.); 11 Sim. 327; Wallworth v. Holt,
(1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch.); 4 My. & Cr. 619.
346. See, e.g., Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.) 202-04; 2 Hare
461, 490-95; Atwool v. Merryweather, [1867] 5 L.R. Eq. 464, 465; Russell v.
Wakefield Waterworks Co., [1875] 20 L.R. Eq. 474, 479-82.
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of all the shareholders in certain circumstances.347 Thus, just
like the plaintiff in a class action represented the other
class members, the shareholder represented the other
shareholders. Like class actions, these shareholder actions
were also originally permitted as an exception to the
necessary parties rule.348 Subsequent cases allowed
shareholders in these lawsuits to bring them on behalf of
themselves and the other shareholders when the
shareholders were so numerous as to make it inconvenient
to bring them all before the court.349 That formulation did
not change until the late 1940s,350 when U.S. courts
347. See, e.g., Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456 (1857); Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Me. 9
(1844); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371; March v. E.R.R. Co., 40 N.H. 548
(1860); Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Hodges v. New
England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850).
348. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); Taylor v. Miami
Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831).
349. See, e.g., Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 52, 56 (1863); Robinson v.
Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 232-33 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). Even today, U.S. courts use the
language of the exceptions to the necessary parties rule in describing
shareholder derivative actions.
The procedural requirements for derivative suits further protect
the corporation and its stockholders by preventing a “multiplicity of
lawsuits,” by limiting “who should properly speak for the corporation”
and by precluding “self-selected advocate[s] pursuing individual gain
rather than the interests of the corporation or the shareholders as a
group, [from] bringing costly and potentially meritless strike suits.” A
derivative lawsuit is thus the vehicle for a shareholder to litigate
injuries that result in the diminution in value of the corporation’s stock.
Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in
original) (quoting Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248,
253 (N.C. App. 2000)).
350. Some earlier opinions had referred to shareholder derivative actions as
being brought on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., Beach v. Cooper, 13 P. 161,
161 (Cal. 1887) (describing shareholder’s action as “brought on behalf of the
corporation”); Glover v. Manila Gold Min. & Mill. Co., 104 N.W. 261, 264 (S.D.
1905) (same); Just v. Idaho Canal & Improvement Co., 102 P. 381, 381 (Idaho
1909) (same); Voorhees v. Mason, 91 N.E. 1056, 1060 (Ill. 1910) (same); Smith v.
Stone, 128 P. 612, 620 (Wy. 1912) (same); Baillie v. Columbia Gold Mining Co.
166 P. 965, 971 (Or. 1917) (same); Barthold v. Thomas, 210 S.W. 506, 507 (Tex.
Comm’n. App. 1919) (same); Gipson v. Bedard, 217 N.W. 139, 140 (Minn. 1927)
(same); Walsh v. Van Ameringen-Haebler, Inc., 248 N.Y.S. 1, 2 (N.Y. App. Div.
1931) (same); Ames v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Portsmouth, 176 S.E. 204, 224 (Va.
1934) (same).
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routinely began to describe shareholder derivative lawsuits
as being brought on behalf of the corporation but without
any explanation for the change. Prior to the 1940s, courts
typically referred to these lawsuits as brought by
shareholders on behalf of all the shareholders.351 Courts had
previously referred to these lawsuits as derivative,352 but
often continued to state that the lawsuits were brought by
shareholders on behalf of all the shareholders.353 In these
351. See, e.g., Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. 626, 627 (1873) (“[T]he individual
shareholder is allowed to assert in behalf of himself and associates, because the
directors of the corporation decline to take the proper steps to assert them.”);
Nussbaum v. Nussbaum, 199 S.E. 169, 172 (Ga. 1938) (“The petition is what is
sometimes called a stockholders’ derivative or representative suit, brought on
behalf of the plaintiffs and other stockholders similarly situated . . . .”);
McIlvaine v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 19 N.E.2d 584, 584 (Ill. 1939) (“This is
a representative suit in equity, instituted by the named plaintiffs on behalf of
themselves and all other stockholders. . . to enforce a derivative cause of action
in favor of the [company] . . . .”); Brady v. Meenan, 198 N.Y.S. 177, 177 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1923) (“This is a derivative action, brought by a stockholder of a
corporation, on behalf of himself and other stockholders . . . .”); Pollitz v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 722 (N.Y. 1912) (“The action is in behalf of the
plaintiff and all other stockholders of the defendant company similarly situated
against the company and five of its directors.”).
352. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (describing case as
“stockholder’s derivative action”); Wales v. Jacobs, 104 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir.
1939) (explaining that the case may not “be entertained as a stockholder’s
derivative suit”); Wile v. Burns Bros., 2 F. Supp. 950, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1932)
(describing case as “stockholders’ derivative suit”); Nussbaum, 199 S.E. at 172
(describing case as “stockholders’ derivative or representative suit”); Alexander
v. Donohoe, 38 N.E. 263, 265 (N.Y. 1894) (“Suing as a stockholder, the plaintiff’s
right of action is a derivative one. He sues, not primarily in his own rights, but
in right of the corporation.”).
353. See, e.g, J.R.A. Corp. v. Boylan, 30 F. Supp. 393, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(stating plaintiff “alleged a derivative stockholder’s suit in behalf of itself, and
all other stockholders similarly situated, against” current and former directors
of American Tobacco Company); Flynn v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 41 N.Y.S. 566,
567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896) (describing the shareholder’s right of action as
“derivative from the corporation, and existing only by the failure of the
corporation to assert its own right” and stating the lawsuit “is on behalf, not
only of the particular plaintiff, but all the stockholders”); cf. In re Swofford Bros.
Dry Goods Co., 180 F. 549, 552 (W.D. Mo. 1910) (describing the action as
“prosecuted by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and the other stockholders of
said corporation and on behalf of said corporation”); Wright v. Floyd, 86 N.E.
971, 972 (Ind. App. 1909) ( “It is well settled that shareholders . . . may bring
suit on behalf of the corporation to protect the interest of the corporation and
incidentally the interest of the members . . . .”); Hingston v. Montgomery, 97
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cases, the corporation was named as a defendant to prevent
it from later bringing a duplicative action.354 By contrast,
modern shareholder derivative actions are filed by
shareholders on behalf of the corporation in both the United
States355 and England.356
This historical account of U.S. shareholder derivative
lawsuits being brought on behalf of all the shareholders
reveals a normative judgment that the shareholders had the
right to seek remedy when the managers engaged in fraud
or mismanagement. While acknowledging that a
corporation was a separate legal entity and that normally
the corporation was the proper party to bring suit against
its managers for mismanagement or fraud, courts also
recognized that corporate managers were not likely to sue
themselves and permitted shareholders to bring suits in
those circumstances.357 Therefore, courts recognized that it
S.W. 202, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906) (stating “stockholder may maintain an action
against the corporation and the offending officers in his own name, though in
reality on behalf of the corporation, and through it of all of its stockholders”).
354. See, e.g., Davenport, 85 U.S. at 627 (“[A] court of equity will not take
cognizance of a bill brought to settle a question in which the corporation is the
essential party in interest, unless it is made a party to the litigation.”); Smith v.
Poor, 40 Me. 415, 422 (1855) (stating that “the corporation is a necessary party,
either as complainants or defendants”); Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods
Corp., 269 N.Y.S. 499, 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (stating when a shareholder
brings an action “on behalf of other stockholders similarly situated, he exercises
a derivative right and judgment must ordinarily be rendered in favor of the
corporation, though the corporation be a defendant in the action.”).
355. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979) (“A derivative suit is
brought by shareholders to enforce a claim on behalf of the corporation.”); Ross
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610,
614 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating a derivative action is “brought by a shareholder in
the name or right of a corporation to redress an injury sustained by, or to
enforce a duty owed to, the corporation’”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 5939-5940 (rev. ed.
2011)).
356. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 § 260(1) (U.K.) (defining a derivative claim as
a proceeding by a member of a company “(a) in respect of a cause of action
vested in the company, (b) and seeking relief on behalf of the company”).
357. See, e.g., Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411, 414 (Del. Ch. 1924)
(“Where the demand if made would be directed to the particular individuals who
themselves are the alleged wrongdoers and who therefore would be invited to
sue themselves, the rule is settled that a demand and refusal is not requisite.”);
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was the shareholders who were harmed in these
circumstances and allowed the shareholders to pursue a
lawsuit.
Equity, at least, recognizes the truth that the stockholders are
the proprietors of the corporate interests, and are ultimately the
only beneficiaries thereof, and the remedies given the corporation
are really, though indirectly, for the protection of their rights. They
may at each authorized election entirely change the directorate
and may at any time keep the directors within the line of faithful
administration by an appeal to a court of equity or repudiate their
358
acts which are intra vires of them, but voidable.

For this reason, early shareholder derivative litigation
struck a balance of power between the board and the
shareholders. The board of directors could be held
accountable by shareholders other than through elections,
and the board was not the sole power controlling the
corporation. Importantly, other stakeholders (such as
employees or customers) were not given this right to pursue
litigation, only the shareholders. The historical and
normative foundation of early shareholder derivative
litigation in the United States bolsters the shareholder
primacy theory and may prove valuable to its advocates.
The shift to shareholder derivative actions brought on
behalf of the corporation that took hold in the late 1940s
through today reveals a different normative judgment. That
a different normative foundation underlies the modern
shareholder derivative action can also be seen in the
increasingly narrow circumstances in which shareholders
are permitted to pursue such litigation.

Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 144 So. 674, 678 (Fla. 1932) (“Under the
showing made by the bill in the instant case, a request that the directors sue
themselves would have been fruitless.”); Estel v. Midgard Inv. Co., 46 S.W.2d
193, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (“The wrongs complained of are charged against
the directors themselves, who are in control of the assets and business of the
corporation. The wrongdoers could hardly be expected to sue themselves.”).
358. Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 725 (N.Y. 1912) (emphasis
added).
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B. Shareholders May File an Action in Limited
Circumstances
To prevent abuse, courts in the United States imposed
limits on when shareholders could seek redress through
litigation. Although some early U.S. lawsuits by
shareholders claiming mismanagement or fraudulent
conduct by directors and officers did not appear to limit
when such suits could be pursued,359 the first decisions of
the New York Chancery Court did impose limitations. The
New York Chancery Court held that if the corporation
refused to prosecute or was still under the control of the
defendants, then shareholders were permitted to file a bill
in their own names and on behalf of all the shareholders,
with the corporation being made a defendant.360 Subsequent
court decisions in other states similarly limited shareholder
lawsuits to instances where the corporation was incapable
of seeking redress or improperly refused to seek redress.361
This historical limitation on shareholder derivative
actions reveals a normative judgment, as did its procedural
nature of being brought on behalf of all the shareholders.
Limiting derivative actions to instances in which the
corporation refused or was unable to seek redress itself
allowed shareholder lawsuits essentially on one topic:
misconduct by the corporation’s directors or officers. 362
Shareholders had the right to seek remedy when these
managers engaged in fraud or mismanagement.363 “Devised
as a suit in equity, the purpose of the derivative action was
359. See, e.g., Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); Taylor v. Miami
Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831); Putnam v. Sweet, 2 Pin. 302 (Wis. 1849).
360. See, e.g., Forbes v. Witlock, 3 Edw. Ch. 446, 448 (N.Y. Ch. 1840);
Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 233 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
361. See, e.g., March v. E. R.R. Co., 40 N.H. 548, 567-68 (1860); Allen v. Curtis,
26 Conn. 456, 461-62 (1857); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 34041 (1850); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 377-78 (1847); Hersey v.
Veazie, 24 Me. 9, 12-13 (1844).
362. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1991) (stating that
“[t]he derivative form of action permits an individual shareholder to bring ‘suit
to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, directors, and third
parties’”) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970)).
363. See id.
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to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a means
to protect the interests of the corporation from the
misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless directors and
managers.’”364 Even though a corporation was a separate
legal entity that should bring suit against its managers for
mismanagement or fraud, courts recognized that corporate
managers were the ones making the corporation’s decisions,
and they were not likely to sue themselves.365 For this
reason, courts in equity permitted shareholders to bring
suits in those circumstances and gave shareholders the
power to hold directors accountable through litigation.
Again, recognizing that it was the shareholders who were
harmed, courts’ decisions to allow such litigation reflected a
balance of power between the board and the shareholders.
This normative foundation of early shareholder derivative
litigation in the United States further bolsters the
shareholder primacy theory.
Modern courts also limit when shareholders can pursue
litigation for misconduct by corporate officers and directors,
but the limitation started becoming much stricter with the
shift to derivative actions being recognized as on behalf of
the corporation. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1946 described
shareholder derivative suits as a remedy “for those
situations where the management through fraud, neglect of
duty or other cause declines to take the proper and
necessary steps to assert the rights which the corporation
has.”366 Today the limitation is typically a precondition “for
the suit,” requiring the shareholder to demonstrate “that
the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable
demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.” 367
Because the board of directors possesses the statutory
authority to manage the corporation and its assets,
including a cause of action,368 federal courts and most state
364. Id. at 95 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
548 (1949)).
365. See supra n. 357 and accompanying text.
366. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167 (1946).
367. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534.
368. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.01(b) (2010).
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courts today permit a shareholder to file a derivative action
only after making demand on the board to rectify the
challenged transaction.369 The board could choose to
prosecute the litigation itself in response to the demand, but
typically the board rejects the demand.370
To pursue a derivative action after a demand has been
rejected, the shareholder must demonstrate to the court
that the demand was wrongfully rejected.371 In some states,
the shareholder can forego making a demand and argue
that demand should be excused.372 To establish either that a
demand was wrongfully rejected by the board or that
demand should be excused, the plaintiff essentially must
show that the business judgment rule does not apply to the
board’s decision.373 The business judgment rule is a defense
that presumes directors acted in a manner consistent with

369. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (“The complaint must be verified and
must . . . state with particularity: (A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the
desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from
the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or
not making the effort.”); DEL. CH. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege
with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action
the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons
for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”);
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (“No shareholder may commence a derivative
proceeding until: (1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to
take suitable action; and (2) 90 days have expired from the date delivery of the
demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the
demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the
corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.”).
370. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, § 8.5, at 395; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare
the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through
Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005) (noting “most boards” decide
“not to bring any action” and “most courts defer to boards on this matter”).
371. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216, 1219 (Del. 1996); BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 19, § 8.5, at 395.
372. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (stating that demand
is excused when officers and directors are under influences that impede their
discretion to act on behalf of the corporation). The MBCA, however, states a
universal demand requirement. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42.
373. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813-14; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, § 8.5, at
395.
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their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.374
Therefore, to show that the directors wrongfully rejected
demand, the plaintiff must establish that a majority of the
directors breached one of their fiduciary duties.375 The
application is similar for cases in which the plaintiff seeks
demand excusal: the plaintiff must establish that a majority
of directors were financially interested or not independent
in making the challenged decision.376 In other words, a trial
court will excuse demand when the board is disabled by a
conflict of interest, because the judge may presume the
directors will not sue themselves. For example, Delaware
excuses demand if the plaintiff can allege particularized
facts creating reasonable doubt that (1) a majority of the
board has a material interest in the challenged transaction;
(2) a majority of the board lacks independence; or (3) the
challenged transition is not the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment.377 New York will excuse demand if the
plaintiff can allege with particularity that (1) a majority of
directors are interested in the transaction; (2) the directors
failed to inform themselves; or (3) the challenged
transaction is so egregious that it could not have been the
product of sound judgment.378

374. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The United Kingdom has never recognized a
judicially-created business judgment rule defense similar to that in U.S. law,
although English judges are reluctant to second-guess directors’ decisions.
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 232(1) (U.K.) (“Any provision that purports to
exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any liability that would
otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void.”); Cheffins & Black,
supra note 137, at 1401.
375. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“Moreover, where demand on a board has
been made and refused, we apply the business judgment rule in reviewing the
board’s refusal to act pursuant to a stockholder’s demand.”); see also Beneville v.
York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that in the case of a board with
only two directors, business judgment rule protection is unavailable because the
interested director can block the action of the impartial director).
376. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814-15.
377. Id. at 812-14; Beneville, 769 A.2d at 85 n.9.
378. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1040-41 (N.Y. 1996).
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However, a majority of states have adopted the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA),379 which was originally
drafted in 1950.380 It requires demand to be made in all
cases, so no excusal of demand is possible.381 The MBCA
therefore limits shareholder derivative litigation more than
the common law standards of states such as Delaware and
New York, which permit demand excusal.382 After the board
rejects a shareholder’s demand, the MBCA requires the
shareholder to allege with particularity facts establishing
that a majority of the board of directors did not consist of
qualified directors at the time the determination to reject
the demand was made.383 The MBCA defines a qualified
director for this purpose as one who does not have “(i) a
material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a
material relationship with a person who has such an
interest.”384 Compared to the discretion provided to judges
through the third elements of the demand excusal
standards of Delaware and New York, the MBCA imposes a
much stricter limitation for shareholders wanting to pursue
derivative litigation.
Both the common law and the MBCA formulations of
the modern limitations on shareholder derivative actions
are far tougher than the limitation expressed in cases in the
1800s. The courts in those cases phrased the limitation in
terms of whether a corporation had been found incapable of
seeking redress or improperly refused to do so.385 Later cases
expanded on the former scenario by focusing on whether the
corporation was still under the control of those who would
379. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at v, ix (2010); LINDA O. SMIDDY & LAWRENCE A.
CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 231 (7th ed. 2010).
380. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at v, ix.
381. Id. § 7.42.
382. See supra nn. 376-77 and accompanying text.
383. Id. § 7.44(c).
384. Id. § 1.43(a)(1).
385. See, e.g., Bronson v. La Crosse & Milwaukie R.R. Co., 69 U.S. 283, 302
(1864); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 335 (1855); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12
Met.) 371, 377-78 (1847); Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415, 422 (1855); Hersey v.
Veazie, 24 Me. 9, 12-13 (1844).
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be defendants in the lawsuit.386 For instance, consider
Robinson v. Smith’s 1832 formulation:
Generally, where there has been a waste or misapplication of the
corporate funds, by the officers or agents of the company, a suit to
compel them to account for such waste or misapplication should
be in the name of the corporation. But as this court never permits
a wrong to go unredressed merely for the sake of form, if it
appeared that the directors of the corporation refused to prosecute
by collusion with those who had made themselves answerable by
their negligence or fraud, or if the corporation was still under the
control of those who must be made the defendants in the suit, the
stockholders, who are the real parties in interest, would be
permitted to file a bill in their own names, making the corporation
a party defendant. And if the stockholders were so numerous as to
render it impossible, or very inconvenient to bring them all before
the court, a part might file a bill, in behalf of themselves and all
387
others standing in the same situation.

These broader statements of when shareholder derivative
lawsuits could be pursued continued through the early
1900s.388 The modern formulations are more limiting for
shareholders wanting to pursue shareholder derivative
litigation and thereby reflect a decrease in shareholder
power.
To some extent, the modern limitations on when a
shareholder derivative lawsuit may be brought, particularly
the business judgment rule defense as applied to demand
386. Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378, 387 (1870); Peabody v. Flint, 88
Mass. (6 Allen) 52, 56 (1863).
387. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 233 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (emphasis
added).
388. See, e.g., McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 193 (Del. Ch. 1931) (holding that
where a defendant controlled the board of directors, “[i]t is manifest then that
there can be no expectation that the corporation would sue him, and, if it did, it
can hardly be said that the prosecution of the suit would be entrusted to proper
hands”); Miller v. Loft, Inc., 153 A. 861, 862 (Del. Ch. 1931) (stating “if by reason
of hostile interest or guilty participation in the wrongs complained of, the
directors cannot be expected to institute suit. . . no demand upon them to
institute suit is requisite”); Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411, 414 (Del.
Ch. 1924) (“Where the demand if made would be directed to the particular
individuals who themselves are the alleged wrongdoers and who therefore
would be invited to sue themselves, the rule is settled that a demand and
refusal is not requisite.”).
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excusal and wrongful rejection of demand determinations,
reflect judges’ reluctance to second-guess directors’
decisions. In many early shareholder cases, courts
expressed concern about adopting a standard of liability
that would render corporate managers liable whenever loss
resulted from their actions. For instance, the opinion in
Percy v. Millaudon may have stated a precursor to the
modern business judgment rule when it expressed concern
about imposing liability whenever loss ensues from
directors’ decisions.389 It stated that “[t]he test of
responsibility, therefore, should be, not the certainty of
wisdom in others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge;
and by showing that the error of the agent is of so gross a
kind that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention,
would not have fallen into it.”390 In 1847, in Godbold v.
Branch Bank at Mobile, the Alabama Supreme Court
espoused a similar concern about holding directors to
“extreme accuracy of knowledge,” particularly when a large
degree of discretion is necessarily entrusted to them. 391 “The
inevitable tendency of such a rule, would be hostile to the
end proposed by it, as no man of ordinary prudence would
[accept] a trust surrounded by such perils.”392 In Hodges v.
New England Screw Co., the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in 1853 also stated a version of deference to the directors:
“We think a Board of Directors acting in good faith and with
reasonable care and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a
mistake, either as to law or fact, are not liable for the
consequences of such mistake.”393 In Spering’s Appeal,394 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1872 stated that directors
389. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829) (“[T]he adoption of
a course from which loss ensues cannot make the agent responsible, if the error
was one into which a prudent man might have fallen. The contrary doctrine
seems to us to suppose the possession, and require the exercise of perfect
wisdom in fallible beings. No man would undertake to render a service to
another on such severe conditions.”).
390. Id. at 78.
391. Godbold v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847).
392. Id.
393. Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853).
394. 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
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“are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they
may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous,
provided they are honest and provided they are fairly within
the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the
managing body.”395 However, all such statements during
this period were made by courts as they decided whether
the directors were liable for their actions. The courts were
not deciding whether the shareholder’s lawsuit may
proceed, as that decision had already been made. Thus, the
modern standard for determining when a shareholder
derivative lawsuit may be pursued differs significantly from
the historical inquiry. This shift also significantly
diminishes shareholders’ power and reflects an alteration in
the normative judgment underlying shareholder derivative
litigation.
C. Possible Explanations for the Shift in Shareholder
Derivative Litigation’s Normative Foundation
The shift in the normative foundation of shareholder
derivative litigation occurred in the late 1940s with courts
regularly recognizing shareholder derivative lawsuits as
being brought on behalf of the corporation. It can also be
seen through modern courts’ adoption of ever stricter
limitations on when shareholders can pursue derivative
litigation. The obvious question is: why did this shift occur?
Did something in the nature of the corporation change, such
as new state legislation that altered the terms by which
corporations were created and governed? Or was it
something else?
1. The Evolution of Corporations in the United States. In
colonial times, corporations were created by royal charters

395. Id. at 24; see also Watts’s Appeal, 78 Pa. 370, 392 (1875) (“[D]irectors are
mandatories only, and as such, held to but ordinary skill and diligence, and are
not responsible to their fellow corporators for the want of judgment and
knowledge. They are personally liable only where they are guilty of fraudulent
conduct or of acts clearly ultra vires.”); Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405, 415
(Pa. 1892) (stating “directors, who are gratuitous mandatories, are only liable
for fraud, or for such gross negligence as amounts to fraud”).
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just as they were in England,396 and only local public service
corporations were well represented.397 After winning
independence from England in the American Revolution,
the United States attained the sovereign power to
incorporate its own corporations, which allowed for business
enterprises to obtain the privileges of limited liability and
conditions of a more stable organization.398 Although
Congress has the power to charter corporations, it has
rarely done so.399 Instead, most U.S. corporations are
created under state law.400
In early U.S. history, very few business corporations
were chartered compared to the staggering numbers that
exist today because “small-scale enterprise was still the
order of the day.”401 However, by 1800 no less than 310
business corporations of various types had been created.402
396. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 448 (1793) (“A corporation is a mere
creature of the King, or of Parliament; very rarely of the latter; most usually of
the former only. It owes its existence, its name, and its laws, (except such laws
as are necessarily incident to all corporations merely as such) to the authority
which create[s] it.”).
397. JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS 5 (1917); see also EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 6 (1954); BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 11
(noting that of the 335 corporations existing in 1800, 219 were turnpike, bridge,
and canal companies; another thirty-six were water, fire protection, and
wharfage companies; while sixty-seven were banks and insurance companies;
and six were engaged in manufacturing).
398. DAVIS, supra note 397, at 6-7; see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory
Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 28
(1936). For the survival of the legal status of corporate charters created under
English law, see Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 551-56,
621-23 (1819) and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 97-104 (1810).
399. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 418-24 (1819) (holding the
Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the power to create a
national bank). The United States has federally chartered 90-plus corporations
over time including the Federal Reserve Banks, Federal Home Loan Banks,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 20101-240101.
400. DODD, supra note 397, at 2.
401. DAVIS, supra note 397.
402. DODD, supra note 397, at 11; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 11
(stating that only 335 profit-seeking corporations were organized in the United
States until 1800, and nearly all of them were organized in the 1890s); DAVIS,
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This number increased in the early 1800s, and “by 1830 the
New England states alone had created nearly 1900 business
corporations.”403 For many decades in American history, “the
almost universal practice was [for the state legislature] to
embody the charter of each corporation in a special act.”404 A
special legislative act created a single particular
corporation, whereas a general corporate statute allowed
incorporation by complying with prescribed conditions. 405
Despite the fact that for many years the privilege of
incorporation was available only by obtaining a special act
of incorporation from the state legislature, it was typically
granted.406 However, as the 19th century progressed,
incorporation through special act came under fire because it
produced opportunities for corruption.407
General corporate statutes eliminated the need to
specially legislate upon applications of incorporation and
supra note 397, at 23-25; Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and
the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 278 (2008) (noting
that these early corporations typically provided some public service).
403. DODD, supra note 397, at 11. Early judicial decisions recognized the
irrevocable nature of the corporate charter. Douglas Arner, Development of the
American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23, 53 (2002) (citing
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)).
404. DODD, supra note 397, at 197. Before 1811, general acts had been present
but were only applied to certain categories of corporations, such as those for
religious purposes. See DAVIS, supra note 397, at 16-18.
405. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE
CORPORATIONS § 2:3 (3d ed. 2012).

ON THE

LAW

OF

406. Dodd, supra note 397, at 28.
407. See id.; see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (“The desire for business expansion [in the
early 1800s] created an irresistible demand for more charters; and it was
believed that under general laws embodying safeguards of universal application
the scandals and favoritism incident to special incorporation could be avoided.”);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 336-37 (1953) (noting that
state legislators were often hesitant to move to a general incorporation statute,
because they would no longer be able to receive bribes for special incorporation
acts); Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business
Relationship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J.
553, 589 (1994) (noting general incorporation statutes were meant to change the
monopolistic nature of special acts and return to the concept of equality of
opportunity).

902

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

produced equality of opportunity that led to the
establishment of a larger variety of corporations. 408 The first
general incorporation act was established in New York’s Act
of 1811.409 However, it was limited to manufacturing
businesses, and the incorporation was limited to 20 years
with capital not to exceed $100,000.410 Connecticut in 1837
adopted a general corporation statute that allowed for the
incorporation of any corporation engaged in “lawful
business.”411 “[By] the outbreak of the Civil War, general
acts for the incorporation of manufacturing and . . . some
other common types of business corporations had been
adopted by most . . . states.”412
Although general incorporation acts were customary
after the Civil War,413 restrictions on corporations, such as
limits on size and scope of corporate activity, remained
common until approximately 1890 due to an attitude of
suspicion and fear toward the corporate mechanism. 414
Given the restrictive nature of the general incorporation
laws, many companies still preferred to seek special
legislative acts for incorporation to attain greater privileges,
and legislators liked the ability to directly influence

408. DODD, supra note 397, at 316; see also Louis K. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 548-49
(Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (noting that general incorporation laws “were,
in part, an expression of the desire for equality of opportunity”). However, some
criticized general laws as a departure from the “true principle upon which an act
of incorporation should ever be granted,” that of public utility. DODD, supra note
397, at 316.
409. COX & HAZEN, supra note 405, § 2:4.
410. Id.
411. SMIDDY & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 379, at 229.
412. Dodd, supra note 397, at 28.
413. SCHLESINGER, supra note 407, at 337.
414. FLETCHER, supra note 387, § 2; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that incorporation
for business purposes was commonly denied because of fear: “Fear of the
subjection of labor to capital. Fear of monopoly. Fear that the absorption of
capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, might bring evils similar to
those which attended mortmain. There was a sense of some insidious menace
inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by
corporations.”).

2013] SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION

903

business activity.415 However, by the end of the 19th
century, most states had added a prohibition against special
charters to their constitutions and eliminated restrictions
on corporate formation and operation.416 In 1855,
Massachusetts enacted the first general law to authorize
the carrying on of business outside of the state that
incorporated the company.417 In 1896, New Jersey enacted
what may be regarded as the first permissive modern
incorporation act that conferred broad powers on
corporations, by removing restrictions on capital and
duration and allowing three or more persons to become a
corporation for “any lawful purpose or purposes whatever,
other than a savings bank, a building and loan association,
[and] an insurance company.”418 Although New Jersey was
the first to enact such a permissive incorporation statute,
Delaware later enacted a nearly identical statute. When
New Jersey revised its statute in 1913 to make it more
restrictive, Delaware became the leader in incorporation
and remains the preeminent state for incorporation today.419
So the shift in the normative foundation of shareholder
derivative litigation that occurred in the late 1940s cannot
be explained by the transition to general incorporation
415. Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation
in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 281 (2004)
(“Although a number of states enacted general laws of incorporation by the midnineteenth century, often these laws were not mandatory, and the influential
usually avoided them and continued to secure special acts of incorporation that
granted them powers and privileges not available through the general
incorporation statute.”); Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its
Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1618 (1981) (stating that “charters often
continued to be granted by special act even when available under general
incorporation statutes” and that special acts “allowed legislatures to relieve
entrepreneurs from the uniform standards of the general statutes”).
416. Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 549 n.4; see also id. at 549 n.3 (stating
that New York in 1822, Delaware in 1831, Illinois in 1848, and Wisconsin in
1848 passed constitutional amendments requiring a legislative supermajority
vote or ratification by popular vote of any bill creating or renewing a corporate
charter); COX & HAZEN, supra note 405, § 2:4.
417. DODD, supra note 397, at 324.
418. JOHN J. TREACY & JOHN MILTON, THE GENERAL CORPORATION ACT OF NEW
JERSEY 5, 8 (1921).
419. COX & HAZEN, supra note 405, § 2:4.
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statutes nor the removal of restrictions on corporations,
because those occurred in the late 1800s to early 1900s.
Furthermore, the growth of the modern public corporation
alone also cannot explain this shift. Public corporations did
not reach full maturity, as known today, until the early
1900s.420 The spread of general corporate laws and the
removal of restrictions on corporations were crucial to the
growth of public corporations.421 In combination, these
changes allowed public corporations to assemble the capital
necessary to expand and the permanence demanded by
long-term investors.422 However, public corporations existed
long before the late 1940s, as evidenced by the stock market
crash of 1929 and the passage of new federal securities laws
to govern public corporations in 1933 and 1934.423
2. Perceptions of Corporations and Derivative Litigation.
The rise of public corporations alone may not explain the
normative shift in shareholder derivative litigation, but
public corporations did cause changes in the perception of
corporations and subsequently shareholder derivative
litigation. Scholarly writing on the issue of corporate
purpose grew during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1932,
Professor Adolf Berle advanced the shareholder primacy
theory, arguing that “all powers granted to a corporation or
420. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 14; Skeel, supra note 15, at 169-70
(noting that shareholders in the United States have been widely dispersed since
the beginning of the twentieth century). Some companies had wider ownership
such as early New England textile companies and the New York Central
Railroad (NYCR). The NYCR, created in 1853 from consolidation of shortline
rail companies, was a public company of nearly 2,500 investors without a
controlling person. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 11-13 & n.3. Similar
corporate ownership patterns can be seen in other entities in the last half of the
1800s in areas such as public utilities and general manufacturing. See id. at 14.
421. See Ballam, supra note 407, at 589.
422. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Who Bears the Costs of Lawyers’
Mistakes?—Against Limited Liability, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 885, 901 (2004) (noting
the benefits of general incorporation statutes for shareholders included “limited
liability, free transferability of shares, passive equity ownership, agency
efficiencies, and perpetual jural existence of corporations”).
423. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78pp).

2013] SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION

905

to the management of a corporation . . . [are] at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the
shareholders.”424 In the same year, Professor Merrick Dodd
advanced the stakeholder theory, arguing that the proper
purpose of a public corporation included not only making
money for shareholders, but also included providing secure
jobs to its employees, quality products for its customers, and
other benefits for society as a whole.425 This debate about
corporate purpose has been well chronicled, and the
stakeholder or managerialist theory won the argument for
several decades, until the shareholder primacy theory
gained the upper hand in the 1970s.426 Given the timing of
this debate about corporate purpose, it appears to have
influenced both courts and legislatures to change their
perspective of shareholder derivative litigation.
A 1944 study of shareholder derivative litigation
commissioned by business leaders in New York 427 may also
have influenced that change of perspective. The Wood
Report examined 1,266 lawsuits filed by shareholders in two
New York counties and one federal district court in New
York from 1932 to 1942.428 Although 693 of the cases
involved closely held corporations, the study focused on the
573 public corporation cases.429 The report criticized the
frequency of shareholder suits filed by small investors and
concluded that these investors were essentially pawns for
the plaintiff’s attorneys, who were the true beneficiaries of
such derivative lawsuits.430 The report also noted that the
corporation ultimately bears the costs of both sides in such
litigation, because it must pay the plaintiff’s attorneys their
fees if the suit provided a benefit to the corporation and it

424. Berle, supra note 3, at 1049.
425. Dodd, supra note 12 at 1146-48.
426. STOUT, supra note 8, at 16-23.
427. FRANKLIN S. WOOD, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF N. Y. STATE, SURVEY
REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944).
428. Id. at 6-7.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 16-21.
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usually must indemnify the fees of the directors.431 The
report’s proposed solution was to limit standing to
shareholders owning stock at the time of the alleged wrong
and to require plaintiffs owning small amounts of stock to
post a bond to secure the defendants’ expenses if the suit
was found to be without merit.432 The New York legislature
enacted the first security for expenses statute a month
later, requiring the plaintiff to post a bond unless he owned
“at least 5% or $50,000 of [the corporation’s] stock.”433
However, over time, this restriction was eased by allowing
shareholders to band together to meet the ownership
requirement.
It is not surprising that corporate directors and officers
dislike the shareholder derivative device; it permits
shareholders to challenge their decisions. The Wood Report
gave directors and officers a basis for arguing to legislatures
and courts that shareholder derivative litigation needed to
be restrained. When the 1944 Wood Report is combined
with the academic debate over corporate purpose in which
the stakeholder or managerialist view had prevailed by the
1940s, the changed perception of the corporation is the most
likely explanation for the normative shift in shareholder
derivative litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the first 150 years of the United States, courts
permitted shareholders to bring a lawsuit on behalf of all
the shareholders, but limited when shareholders could bring
such actions to instances where the corporation was
incapable of seeking redress or improperly refused to seek
redress. This historical account reveals a normative
judgment that shareholders, as a group, had the right to
431. Id.
432. Id. at 21-25.
433. Skeel, supra note 15, at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Ch. 668, §61-b, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1455); see also 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1835, at 164 n.1 (3d ed. 2007) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states
adopting security for expenses statutes).
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seek remedy when the managers engaged in fraud or
mismanagement. While acknowledging a corporation was a
separate legal entity that normally was the proper party to
bring suit against its managers for mismanagement or
fraud, courts recognized that corporate managers controlled
the corporation’s decision to sue and were not likely to sue
themselves. For this reason, courts of equity permitted
shareholders to bring suits in those circumstances on behalf
of all shareholders. Thus, recognizing that it was the
shareholders who were harmed, courts’ choice to allow
litigation reflected a balance of power between the board
and the shareholders. The board of directors could be held
accountable by shareholders other than through elections,
and the board was not the sole power controlling the
corporation. Notably, other stakeholders such as employees
were not given this right to pursue litigation, only
shareholders. The historical and normative foundation of
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States
bolsters the shareholder primacy theory and may prove
valuable to its advocates.
At the same time, other scholars could focus on the
reasons for the normative shift and suggest corresponding
changes to the structure of shareholder derivative litigation.
Today shareholders may bring a derivative lawsuit on
behalf of the corporation and only within much narrower
circumstances. This modern shareholder derivative action
reflects the theory that the corporation is an entity unto
itself. Shareholders’ role in the corporation through modern
shareholder derivative litigation has been markedly
diminished. This shift was driven by a change in the
perception of public corporations, but nothing in the
fundamental nature of the corporation changed because the
state laws creating corporations did not change. State
statutes always gave the board of directors the power to
make the corporation’s decisions. Yet courts, and later those
legislatures adopting the MBCA, altered the balance of
power between boards of directors and shareholders that
had existed for 150 years through shareholder derivative
litigation. While these changes were driven by the
perception of public corporations, the shareholder derivative
action was altered for all corporations, both public and
private. Perhaps it is time to rethink shareholder derivative
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litigation in relation to the nature of corporations and their
purposes.

